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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“When people tell you that there is nothing inherently wrong with tribes, what they 
are really saying is that they lack the courage to leave the familiar embrace of 
inclusion that allows them to “other” their neighbours or to disparage their 
perceived own in ways that they imagine to be very progressive. They are nervous 
about the unknown and can’t imagine any other way of seeing the world except 
through the fractured lens of tribe.”1 
 
-------------------------- 
 
“There is a crisis in Maasailand. It is intentional because how 
else could the government continue the exploitation of the 
Maasai people. It is tantamount to genocide.”2 
 
 
 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
 In the absence of a state that acts as an impartial arbiter in inter-group 
competition for power and resources or one that establishes the rules of the game 
and distributes rewards and punishments equitably, ethnicity and ethnic identity 
have come to play a central role in Kenyan politics. Instances of ethnically-motivated 
violence such as that which engulfed Kenya after the 2007 presidential elections may 
lead one to assume that ethnic identity and ethnic mobilization presume a level of 
overt violence within society when in practice the implications are often more 
subtle. In Kenya, as in many African countries, ethnicity has been historically used 
to resolve the central issue of politics, which according to Harold Lasswell is defined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Joyce	  Nyairo,	  “Ethnic	  identities	  are	  imagined	  entities	  and	  it	  is	  time	  we	  fashioned	  new	  ones,”	  Daily	  
Nation,	  August	  2,	  2012.	  2	  Interlocutor	  F	  
	   	   2	  
as “who gets what, when, how.”3 In other words, ethnic origin rather than merit 
becomes the primary determinant of one’s ability to access the stuffs of the state. As 
a consequence, ethnicity plays a dominant role in politics as an instrument of social 
mobilization. As Francois Nielsen suggests, the mobilization of the members of a 
particular ethnic group “means that they allocate some of their resources, such as 
time, energy, money, votes, psychological commitment and physical courage, to the 
collective effort” of the ethnic group. 4  
 Though there is an expansive literature on the role of ethnicity in politics, 
particularly in the African context, there have been few attempts to understand the 
complex nature of ethnic identity and ethnic solidarity through context-specific 
investigations that highlight the perspectives and experiences of historic and 
contemporary cultural, economic, and political factors which often reinforce social 
mobilization and political participation along ethnic lines. This is particularly true of 
smaller ethnic groups who seek greater participation and engagement in the 
political and economic spheres of society. The Maasai of Kenya make an interesting 
case study of ethnic social movement. As one of the smallest ethnic groups in Kenya, 
the Maasai have a long tradition of social mobilization and political claim-making 
based on a history of land dispossession, and economic, social, and cultural 
marginalization.5 Though the Maasai population spans the region of southern Kenya 
and northern Tanzania, Kenyan Maasai are often viewed as being more politically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Harold	  Dwight	  Lasswell,	  “Who	  gets	  what,	  when,	  how,”	  in	  The	  Political	  Writings	  of	  Harold	  D.	  Lasswell.	  (Glencoe,	  IL:	  Free	  Press,	  1951).	  4	  Francois	  Nielsen,	  “Toward	  a	  Theory	  of	  Ethnic	  Solidarity	  in	  Modern	  Societies,”	  American	  Sociological	  
Review,	  50,	  No.	  2	  (April	  1985),	  137.	  5	  The	  Maasai	  make	  up	  less	  than	  2%	  of	  the	  population	  in	  Kenya.	  Source:	  	  CIA,	  UK	  Foreign	  Office,	  accessed	  from	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7215673.htm	  on	  January	  10,	  2013.	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active and better socially mobilized than Tanzanian Maasai.6  Dorothy Hodgson 
suggests that some of the differences in social mobilization between Kenyan and 
Tanzanian Maasai may be attributed to the specific experiences of colonialism and 
early state formation, and in particular, the way the concept of property rights 
emerged in the respective states.7  Yet, few studies have examined the process by 
which ethnic identity and social mobilization is used by the Maasai in their 
interactions with the Kenyan political system. The current political environment in 
Kenya presents an important opportunity to examine the factors that influence the 
Maasai’s political mobilization, including those factors that may reinforce the use of 
ethnicity as an instrument for political engagement.  
 
1.2 Objective of Thesis 
This study seeks to understand the factors that have contributed to the 
formation of the Maasai ethnic identity and social mobilization in Kenya. Through 
the use of a methodology that employs interviews and ethnographic work with the 
Maasai of Kenya, this research brings to light the perspectives, experiences, attitudes 
and ideologies that drive collective social action within the Maasai community, and 
the strategies and action repertoires that characterize Maasai political movement in 
Kenya. It is hoped that this study will shed light on the factors that work to reinforce 
ethnic solidarity, and ethnically-based social mobilization and political claim-
making among the Maasai. Here I follow Nielsen’s working two-prong definition of 
ethnic solidarity: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Dorothy	  L.	  Hodgson,	  Being	  Maasai,	  Becoming	  Indigenous	  (Bloomington	  IN:	  	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  52-­‐53.	  	  7	  Ibid,	  p.	  53.	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1. the formulation of specific goals or claims defined by the 
membership of the ethnic group as opposed to, or in 
contradistinction with, other groups in the society; 
2. a degree of ideological and organizational mobilization of group 
membership for the implementation of these claims.8  
  
 My primary research question is simply:  Why do the Maasai engage in social 
mobilization on the basis of ethnic group claims? Secondary research questions 
include: What factors contributed to the making of the Maasai ethnic identity? What 
are the historical and contemporary economic, social, cultural and political factors 
that underscore ethnically-based political claim-making among the Maasai in 
Kenya? What attitudes are held within the Maasai community on issues pertaining 
to the Kenyan state, citizenship, and political representation? Considering the 
adoption of a new constitution in 2010 which called for greater representation of 
minority groups and a radical devolution of power to newly formed counties, I also 
seek to understand how this moment in time is experienced by the Maasai as well as 
how the current political environment fits into the broader history of 
marginalization lived by the Maasai people. 
 
1.3 Ethnicity, Ethnic Politics and Democracy in the Literature 
 A key component of this project is to consider the ways ethnic solidarity may 
be mobilized within the Maasai community as a strategy for participation in Kenya’s 
multi-ethnic democracy. The challenge was thinking about how to approach this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Nielsen,	  1985,	  p.	  136.	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study given the considerable breadth of literature dealing with issues of ethnicity 
and ethnic mobilization, and the inherent problems associated with defining a 
singular Maasai ethnic community.  In other words, how would I define the Maasai 
social movement?  What are the boundaries between Maasai and other groups, and 
who or what factors determine those boundaries?  Moreover, because what it means 
to be Maasai may be ever-shifting and evolving, any social mobilization or political 
claims by individuals or groups identifying themselves as Maasai may not be 
quantifiable or stable. In thinking about these issues I turned to a broad literature 
dealing with ethnicity, ethnic boundary-making, nation and nationhood, and the 
production of difference.  
 Ethnicity itself is a problematic term. Barth (1969) argued for rethinking our  
understanding of ethnicity by challenging earlier notions that viewed ethnic groups 
as objective categories possessing rigidly defined, stable and measurable 
characteristics. Instead, Barth argues that ethnic boundaries are often fluid and 
unstable, emerging through interactions between ‘actors’ as distinctions are drawn 
within and between groups.  Like Barth, Kasfir (1979) is also concerned with the 
construction of ethnic identity. Kasfir argues that identity, including ethnic identity, 
is best viewed as a product of individual rationalizations, perceptions and 
experiences that act as “causal factors” compelling individuals to prefer a particular 
social identity within a particular social situation.9  In this way, ethnicity is but one 
of many possible identities that serve as a rallying point for social mobilization and 
political action. Often, Kasfir suggests, the reaction of others to an individual or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Nelson	  Kasfir,	  “Explaining	  Political	  Participation,”	  World	  Politics	  31,	  No.	  3	  (1979):	  	  366.	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group’s assertion of ethnic affiliation is equally important in forming an ethnic 
political identity. He argues:  
It may seem unduly restrictive to require both insiders and 
outsiders to share a perception of ethnic membership before 
labeling participation as ethnic. But since self-perception and 
external perception affect one another in most instances, 
widespread agreement can often be achieved on membership 
boundaries. 10 
 
 For Kasfir, the greatest challenge in the study of ethnic political identity is 
coming to terms with the shifting and subjective nature of ethnic categories and the 
ways they are constructed and activated. He notes for instance that while an 
individual may make political claims based on a particular ethnic category at a 
particular time and place, that does not suggest that they will continue to assert that 
ethnic identity as the basis for political claims in other places and at other times. In 
fact, because identity itself is fluid, we may find that it shifts from an ethnic category 
to other identities of class, religion, nation, etc.  If we accept that the “identities 
people assume are both multiple and intermittent,” it is crucial that the researcher 
consider the “situation that activates the particular identity the individual chooses.”11  
The central point for Kasfir is that the study of ethnicity always entails situational 
analysis. He suggests that even when shared perception permits sufficient social 
solidarity to “turn individuals assigned to an ethnic category into an active ethnic 
group…the likelihood of social solidarity being channeled into participation 
depends on the opportunities created by the specific political situation.”12 Moreover, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Kasfir,	  1979,	  p.	  370.	  11	  Ibid,	  p.	  372,	  italics	  added.	  	  12	  Ibid,	  p.	  366,	  italics	  added.	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the emergence and coalescence of an ethnic group in any given situation should not 
be construed as evidence of the presence or absence of a “continuous subculture.”13 
 Brubaker (2002) further develops this idea by suggesting that we move 
beyond thinking of ethnicity as simply constructed and seek to specify how it is 
constructed.  Brubaker argues that we must reject the tendency to utilize conceptions 
of “ethnic groupism” which treats ethnic groups as internally homogenous and 
externally bounded, collective actors with a common purpose. Within this context,  
Brubaker argues, ethnicity is best conceptualized as not a “thing in the world” but a 
“perspective on the world.”14 Therefore, as researchers we must seek to understand 
the moments in which ethnic identity emerges and ethnic group boundaries 
crystalize.  By adjusting our conceptual lenses to see ethnicity as a “happening,” 
rather than an entity, we are able to shift our attention from the study of groups to 
the study of groupness (i.e., the making of the group).15  
 This cognitive turn is crucial to the researcher who seeks to understand ethnic 
political mobilization because it allows us to “take account of—and potentially, to 
account for—phases of extraordinary cohesion and moments of intensely felt 
collective solidarity, without implicitly treating high levels of groupness as constant, 
enduring or definitionally present.”16  Within this cognitive frame, the work of the 
researcher is to understand how and why ethnic and national categories take on 
meaning in daily life, inspire solidarity, and animate groups into collective action.17  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Ibid,	  p.	  388.	  14	  Rogers	  Brubaker,	  “Ethnicity	  Without	  Groups,”	  In	  Ethnicity	  Without	  Groups,	  Selected	  Works	  of	  Rogers	  Brubaker.	  (University	  of	  California,	  Los	  Angeles,	  	  2002),	  174-­‐175.	  Accessed	  at	  http://works.bepress.com/wrb/7.	  	  15	  Ibid,	  p.	  168.	  16	  Ibid,	  pp.	  168,	  italics	  added	  for	  emphasis.	  17	  Ibid,	  pp.	  178-­‐179.	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We can also examine the circumstances that contribute to the manifestation of ethnic 
groupness and the group-making process.  If ethnicity is but one of many identities 
that manifest in groupness, then we must seek to understand the perceptions, 
interpretations, representations, categorizations and identifications that contribute to 
this identity formation. According to Brubaker, our analysis must include 
“ethnicized ways of seeing (and ignoring), of construing (and misconstruing), of 
inferring (and misinferring), of remembering (and forgetting).” 18   
 By examining group-making as a social project, we may attune to moments of 
intense ethnopolitical conflict, when ethnic identity and ethnic groupness crystalize 
and are animated into action. Equally important, according to Brubaker, is the 
identification of times when ethnic groupness may not happen and times when 
“high levels of groupness fail to materialize.”19  This allows us to understand the 
factors contributing to the manifestation of ethnic group action, and prevents us 
from assuming an “over-ethnicized view of the social world.”20   
 Since the group making process happens within a particular social situation, 
it is also important that we consider the interactions and engagements between 
ethnic groups and the institutions of the state. The literature on minority rights, 
inclusion, exclusion, and production of difference is also helpful in understanding 
how groups on the periphery of society negotiate their position and construct 
political claims to resolve longstanding cultural and structural inequality. This 
aspect of the broad literature aids in our understanding of the power dynamics of 
democracies and how issues of nationalism engage with notions of group identity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Brubaker,	  2002,	  pp.	  174-­‐175.	  19	  Ibid.	  20	  Ibid,	  pp.	  168	  and	  170.	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Though it may be expedient to focus on the cultural claims made by ethnic minority 
groups, Young (2000) argues that often group-based movements, even those which 
incorporate cultural claims, are derived not from cultural difference per se, but from 
“relatively constituted structural differentiations.” 21   Young suggests that the 
literature on social inclusion and exclusion too often view ethnic and minority 
movements as concerned primarily with achieving cultural recognition. Yet, often 
where claims to cultural recognition do exist they are employed as a means to 
correct “domination and wrongful deprivation” of ethnic minority groups.22  
 Young also argues that we must be concerned with the “specificity of group 
difference” out of which social movements arise. In particular, she suggests that the 
“primary form of social difference” is best conceptualized through a relational logic 
rather than a substantive logic assumed in most notions of group identity. Young 
writes, 
The primary form of social difference to which the 
movements respond, moreover, is structural 
difference, which may build on but is not reducible to 
cultural differences of gender, ethnicity or religion. 
Social structures often position people unequally in 
processes of power, resource allocation, or discursive 
hegemony.23 
 
 The problem for Young is that often when the literature discusses the politics 
of cultural difference, the complex social processes of marginalization and racism 
are obscured. “What is at stake in many of these conflicts,” according to the author, 
“is not simply freedom of expression and association, but substantively equal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Iris	  Marion	  Young,	  Inclusion	  and	  Democracy	  (Oxford:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  p.	  7-­‐13.	  22	  Ibid,	  p.	  83.	  23	  Ibid,	  pp.	  86-­‐87.	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opportunity for individuals from marginalized groups to develop and exercise their 
capacities, and to have meaningful voice in the governance of the institutions whose 
roles and policies condition their lives.”24 Therefore, the political claims being made 
by individuals and groups espousing ethnic group identity must always be 
contextualized and historicized within a broader context of economic, political, 
social and institutional realities. Young cautions that when cultural difference 
dominates the political discourse on group difference, including ethnic group 
difference, these “positional issues are harder to raise and discuss.”25  Kasfir (1979) 
also acknowledged the problem of competing claims, noting that, “even where 
ethnic symbols are merely the façade for economic grievances, they often structure 
the political situation and thus affect the outcome.”26  
 In the post-colonial African context, the construction of political identities 
must also be understood as a consequence of the history of state formation. 
Mamdani (2001) argues that the formation of contemporary political identities often 
began in the colonial period where the application of different forms of legal 
personhood was part of the construction of difference, first in racial terms (between 
Europeans and Africans), then in ethnic terms (between African ethnic groups). 
Mamdani further argues that often the movement for independence actually 
contributed to the perpetuation of the colonial legacy of ethnic division as new 
African leaders adopted the very same institutions of subordination and ethnic 
division first introduced by colonial rulers.27 Of particular importance to the author 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Ibid,	  pp.	  81-­‐82.	  25	  Ibid.	  26	  Kasfir,	  1979,	  p.	  369.	  27	  Mahmood	  Mamdani,	  “Beyond	  Settler	  and	  Native	  as	  Political	  Identities:	  	  Overcoming	  the	  Political	  Legacy	  of	  Colonialism,”	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History,	  43,	  No.	  4	  	  (2001),	  657.	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are conditions that define one’s relationship to the institutions of the state based on 
their “legally defined and inscribed” ethnic affiliation.28  With this recognition, 
Mamdani challenges the notion that state formation and the nation-building process 
in post-colonial Africa must aspire to the formation of a liberal state which abides by 
principles of ethnocultural neutrality.29  Instead, he suggests that we must carefully 
historicize our study of the post-colony to reflect the formation of a particular type of 
state and citizen.  
 Of particular concern to the study of ethnicity in the African context are the 
ways ethnic group affiliation may contribute to the phenomenon of “divided 
loyalties” and “dichotomy of citizenship.”30  Ndegwa (1997) examines the emergence 
of ethnic and national alliances in Kenya’s post-colonial democracy, arguing that 
citizens often hold “multiple and shifting identities” and “competing visions of 
political community and of citizenship” which are influenced by, and in turn served 
to frame “the conflict over what institutions are appropriate to structure democratic 
politics in the multi-ethnic state.”31  In particular, Ndegwa argues that the transfer of 
political allegiance from ethnic community to the new national political community 
has been delayed in many parts of Kenya, particularly among ethnic minority 
groups such as the Maasai, because they were largely excluded from the state 
making process, and could “only remotely influence the dynamics at the center.” 32    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Ibid,	  p.	  663.	  	  29	  Will	  Kymlicka,	  “The	  new	  debate	  on	  minority	  rights	  in	  multiculturalism	  and	  political	  theory,”	  In	  
Muticulturalism	  &	  Political	  Theory,	  eds.	  Anthony	  Simon	  Laden	  and	  David	  Owen.	  (New	  York:	  	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007).	  	  30	  Stephen	  Ndegwa,	  “Citizenship	  and	  Ethnicity:	  	  An	  Examination	  of	  Two	  Transition	  Moments	  in	  Kenyan	  Politics,”	  The	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  vol.	  91,	  No.	  3	  (1997),	  	  599-­‐616.	  	  31	  Ibid,	  pp.	  604-­‐606.	  32	  Ibid,	  p.	  607.	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 In understanding the meanings of political allegiance and citizenship in post-
colonial Kenya it is also crucial to locate citizen and group within the context in 
which the country’s multi-ethnic democracy was formed. According to Ndegwa, the 
immediate post-independence period of party formation contributed to stratified 
citizenship. The predominance of the “single leader” party politics in Kenya relied 
heavily on the personality and ethnic affiliation of the party leader. Ndegwa writes 
that this single leader provided the “intellectual and financial patronage who drew a 
core of founders linked more by personal ties forged in the ethnic arena than by 
ideological commitment. This core group relied on family, clan, and ethnicity as the 
initial scaffolding for the party infrastructure.” 33  As Mamdani might suggest, the 
centrality of  family, clan and ethnic group to the making of patronage systems was 
deeply rooted in the colonial experience.  In Kenya, colonial policies greatly 
restricted African political engagement to the local areas, which were largely 
ethnically homogenous and closed to outsiders.34 While Ndegwa argues that the 
transfer of political allegiance to the post-colonial state was less threatening for the 
“larger ethnic groups,” such as the Kikuyu and Luo—a contention I will address 
more seriously in the concluding chapter—he also acknowledges that for the smaller 
ethnic groups, the reluctance to transfer allegiance to the nation was largely due to 
the rationalization that the “obligations to the larger political independence were not 
adequately balanced by the benefits of inclusion.”35 
 In conclusion, this review of literature demonstrates the importance of 
historicizing the study of ethnicity, ethnic group formation and social mobilization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Ibid,	  pp.	  604-­‐607.	  34	  Ibid.	  35	  Ibid,	  p.	  607.	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of ethnic groups. At the same time, it suggests that ethnicity and ethnic groups are 
best viewed as part of a complex intermeshing of individual and group perspectives, 
attitudes, experiences, interactions and ideologies. Within this context, we may 
examine ethnicity and ethnic groups as one form of social organization and social 
identification which may emerge in response to the mobilizational need of  
individuals and groups seeking to resolve issues of cultural, economic or political 
significance. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 This project builds on years of informal and formal interaction with the 
Maasai community of Kenya, beginning with my experience as a U.S. Peace Corps 
volunteer stationed in a rural Maasai community in 2007 and 2008.  Formal 
fieldwork was conducted from May through mid-August 2012.  During that period, 
I employed a mixed methods approach, which consisted of formal and informal 
interviews, participant observation and review of media publications and policy 
documents.  
 
1.4.1 Geographic Area of Focus 
 Though the perspectives of national activists within the Maasai community 
are included in this research, this study focuses primarily on Kajiado County in the 
southern Rift Valley province of Kenya.  Kajiado County constitutes a large portion 
of the geographic area in the south and southeast region of Kenya known as 
Maasailand because of the high population of Maasai living and settling in this area 
since the early to mid-nineteenth century. (See Figure 3.2, Kenya: Political Map of 
County Constituencies, 2012, page 59.) 
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 Today this area constitutes the mainstay of Maasai pastoralists practicing 
traditional semi-nomadic settlement patterns. Kajiado County also represents an 
important political constituency for the Maasai people. Its proximity to Nairobi and 
increased rates of in-migration, agricultural development and industrialization 
make Kajiado County an important microcosm for examining the Maasai social 
mobilization amidst the changing physical, political, economic and social 
environment within a defined political constituency.   
 Time constraints made it impossible to include in-depth analysis of the 
contemporary factors affecting Maasai communities beyond the Kajiado area. In 
particular, the long-standing and well-documented issues of land dispossession 
among the northern Laikipia Maasai and southern Magadi Maasai are not explicitly 
covered in this research. The limitation of focusing only on the issues affecting the 
Kajiado area is that the findings presented in this research may not translate beyond 
the population of Maasai in this area. However, the inclusion of interlocutors 
representing national NGOs as well as the extensive historical treatment within this 
research allows me to make broader statements with regard to ethnic identity 
formation and social mobilization than might otherwise have been possible.  
 
1.4.2  The Interview Process 
 Interviews largely focused on self-identified advocates or “activists” within 
the Maasai community as well as individuals working within non-governmental 
organizations representing Maasai interests. However, anecdotes and informal 
commentaries gathered in the course of extensive interactions with Maasai 
communities have also been included in this research. Formal interviews were 
conducted in English or Kimaasai, with the help of a translator. Henceforth, I will 
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refer to individuals who participated in the formal interviews as interlocutors. 
Though many of the participants agreed to have their identities revealed, I made the 
decision to maintain strict confidentiality to shield them from possible backlash due 
to the politically sensitive nature of the issues on which they volunteered opinion.  I 
also make reference to acquaintances who are individuals that did not participate in 
formal interviews but who were open to sharing their opinions and perspectives 
with me in the course of this research. Some of my acquaintances are friends, former 
colleagues or former neighbors whom I met during my time as a Peace Corps 
volunteer. The nature of these relationships is deeper and more open than those 
with the interlocutors who primarily were professionals in NGOs, activists, or local 
leaders with whom I did not have pre-existing relationships prior to the period of 
fieldwork.  
 Throughout the text, interlocutors are referenced by alphabetical indicators 
based on the order of appearance in the text. Appendix C includes brief biographical 
information on all individuals who are quoted, however personal information has 
been omitted to ensure confidentiality.  
 For this research, I have defined the Maasai social movement as the collective 
action or social and political mobilization of individuals or organizations who self-
identify as members of the Maasai community. This may include activities such as 
direct political action, the act of mobilizing groups for social justice issues, protests, 
or educational campaigns pertaining to historical or contemporary issues affecting 
the Maasai. The definition of social movement may also include the planning or act 
of mobilization, as well as the intent to mobilize, represent or advocate on behalf of 
Maasai individuals and organizations. Given the subjective nature of ethnic group 
categorization, my operational definition of Maasai is based on self-identification of 
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individuals and groups claiming to be members of the Maasai ethnic group.  It 
should also be noted that the inclusion of Maasai who self-identified as advocates or 
activists presents some limitation in the translatability of this research, as the views, 
perspectives, and strategies of these individuals may not purport to the general 
population of Maasai.  
 
1.5 Organization of Thesis  
 This thesis seeks to provide both rich historical grounding on the production 
of the Maasai ethnic identity and social mobilization and an in depth exploration of 
the contemporary experiences of the Maasai people in Kajiado County, Kenya based 
on fieldwork from May through August 2012.   
 The intent of this introductory chapter was to provide context for 
understanding the research questions under consideration, the methodology 
employed in this project and the theoretical approach I utilized in examining this 
fascinating and complex issue. Chapter 2 seeks to provide an overview of the 
political history of the Maasai in Kenya, with particular emphasis on their 
experiences within the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. Chapter 3 
constitutes the core of  ethnographic fieldwork in Kenya; here I attempt to delve 
more deeply into the central theme of Maasai political and social mobilization in 
Kenya.  Specifically, I focus on Kajiado County which represents a microcosm of the 
larger issues of political representation, inclusion/exclusion, and economic 
marginalization experienced by the Maasai. This chapter incorporates a discussion 
of the 2010 constitutional reform which was aimed at devolving administrative 
responsibilities to newly formed Counties, and an evaluation of recent policies 
aimed at increasing development in Kajiado County which have broad economic 
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and social implications for the Maasai people.  In Chapter 4, I consider the future of 
the Maasai social movement taking into consideration the opportunities and 
constraints presented by the contemporary political and economic environment in 
Kenya. Finally, in chapter 5, I conclude with a summation of the thesis and brief 
discussion of outstanding questions and suggestions for future areas of research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
POLITICS OF EXCLUSION AND THE MAKING OF THE MAASAI 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
  
2.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I examine the history of the Maasai people of Kenya, with 
particular emphasis on their shared experiences and interactions with other groups 
and how those interactions have contributed to the formation of a Maasai political 
identity. Given contemporary claims by the Maasai regarding historical injustices, it 
is of particular importance that we consider their experiences during the colonial 
period and in the process of state formation, as well as the post-independence era. It 
is argued here that during these crucial periods, the Maasai’s position on the 
margins of society was first established, and it is here that we come to understand 
the history of marginalization and exclusion that continues to influence the social 
mobilization and political identity of the Maasai of Kenya.  
 
2.2 Origins of Maasai Society in the Pre-Colonial Period 
 During the 9th century a large community of Maa speaking people migrated 
from southern Sudan along the great Rift Valley of Kenya, occupying an area 
extending from Lake Baringo in the north of Kenya to central Tanzania.36  Over time, 
linguistic specialization took place between the Northern and Southern dialects as 
groups began to migrate southeast and southwest from Nakuru in Western Kenya 
toward Loita, Mara and the Serengeti, and across the Athi plains toward 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  See	  Thomas	  Spear,	  “Introduction,”	  in	  Being	  Maasai:	  Ethnicity	  &	  Identity	  in	  East	  Africa,	  eds.	  Thomas	  Spear	  and	  Richard	  Waller	  (London:	  	  James	  Currey	  Ltd,	  1993);	  W.	  Ng’ang’a,	  Kenya’s	  
Ethnic	  Communities:	  Foundation	  of	  the	  Nation,	  (Nairobi:	  	  Gatundu	  Publishers	  Limited,	  2006):	  	  393-­‐407.	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Kilimanjaro.37 During the 18th and 19th centuries an “intense period” of economic 
differentiation and specialization of peoples in the region emerged, whereby 
pastoral life became central to the Maasai identity.” 38  Scholars such as Sutton (1993) 
and Galaty (1981) argue that the Maasai’s specialization in pastoral economy was 
central to, and in fact, pre-dated the emergence of the Maasai culture, though the 
two processes may be best described as deeply intertwined and not easily separated. 
During the second Maa expansion in the 19th century the name ‘Maasai’ first 
appeared. 39  It was during this period, when pastoralism came to dominate the Rift 
Valley, that Maasai identity is believed to have solidified.40    
 Against this backdrop, the Maasai adopted a system of social organization 
focused on preserving the pastoral way of life.41  Of particular importance to 
maintaining pastoral life was the establishment of norms and structures which 
reinforced the value of social, rather than material, currency.42 The practice of 
polygyny and the development of a strong age-set system reinforced bonds among 
families and clans, and helped to promote a reliable system of self-defense, trade, 
and a ready supply of diverse stock-partners for breeding and rearing livestock. In 
the pre-colonial period, the cyclical age-set process formed the backbone of social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  J.E.G.	  Sutton,	  “Becoming	  Maasailand,”	  in	  Being	  Maasai:	  Ethnicity	  and	  Identity	  in	  East	  Africa,	  eds.	  Thomas	  Spear	  and	  Richard	  Waller	  (London:	  James	  Currey	  Ltd,	  1993);	  Gabriele	  Sommer	  and	  Rainer	  Vossen,	  “Dialects,	  Sectiolects,	  or	  Simply	  Lects?	  The	  Maa	  Language	  in	  Time	  Perspective,”	  in	  Being	  Maasai:	  Ethnicity	  
&	  Identity	  in	  East	  Africa,	  eds.	  Thomas	  Spear	  and	  Richard	  Waller	  (London:	  	  James	  Currey	  Ltd,	  1993).	  38	  Thomas	  Spear,	  “Introduction,”	  in	  Being	  Maasai:	  Ethnicity	  &	  Identity	  in	  East	  Africa,	  eds.	  Thomas	  Spear	  and	  Richard	  Waller	  (London:	  James	  Currey	  Ltd),	  pp.	  2-­‐	  9;	  J.E.G.	  Sutton,	  “Becoming	  Maasailand,”	  in	  in	  Being	  
Maasai:	  Ethnicity	  &	  Identity	  in	  East	  Africa,	  eds.	  Thomas	  Spear	  and	  Richard	  Waller	  (London:	  James	  Currey	  Ltd),	  pp.	  39-­‐41.	  39	  John	  Galaty,	  “The	  Eye	  that	  Wants	  a	  Person	  Where	  Can	  it	  Not	  See?	  Inclusion,	  Exclusion,	  and	  Boundary	  Shifters	  in	  Maasai	  Identity,”	  in	  Being	  Maasai:	  Ethnicity	  &	  Identity	  in	  East	  Africa,	  eds.	  Thomas	  Spear	  and	  Richard	  Waller	  (London:	  James	  Currey	  Ltd,	  1993),	  pp	  174-­‐194.	  40	  Thomas	  Spear,	  Being	  Maasai,	  1993,	  p.	  20.	  41	  John	  Galaty,	  “Land	  and	  Livestock	  among	  Kenya’s	  Maasai,”	  Journal	  of	  Asian	  and	  African	  Studies,	  vol.	  16,	  no.	  1-­‐2	  (1981),	  p.	  68.	  42	  J.	  Galaty,	  1981,	  pp.	  69-­‐72.	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relations among the Maasai. It is this ritual process that established harmony and 
stability among the pastoralist as it dictated certain roles and responsibilities for 
males based on the ceremonial ‘rite of passage’ from youth to adulthood, elder-
hood, and finally old age and death.43   
 Scholarship on the Maasai suggests that they were ethnic “shifters” who 
developed a complex but autonomous sense of identity through a pattern of 
strategic assimilation, opportunistic openness and the inclusion of peripheral 
groups.44  Preserving the pastoral way of life required the Maasai to be adaptive and 
cooperative. Maasailand itself during this period is best conceived as a “dynamic, 
fluid region with semi-autonomous groups engaging in various ways within and 
outside of Maasai territory.”45   The fluidity of geographic and ethnic borders 
allowed for deep levels of interaction between and among ethnic communities.46 
During this period, the Maasai were highly successful pastoralists, able to extract 
“maximum benefit from the lands” by drawing on extended networks of semi-
autonomous groups, particularly the Kikuyu agriculturalists, with whom they  
traded in pastoral and agricultural products.47  It is also noteworthy that non-Maasai 
could gain entry into Maasai society, indeed “becoming Maasai” themselves, 
through ritual initiation into the age-set systems and by adopting pastoralism as a 
way of life. The fluidity and adaptability of the Maasai during this period was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Paul	  Spencer,	  “Becoming	  Maasai,	  Being	  in	  Time,”	  in	  Being	  Maasai:	  Ethnicity	  &	  Identity	  in	  East	  Africa,	  eds.	  Thomas	  Spear	  and	  Richard	  Waller	  (London:	  James	  Currey	  Ltd,	  1993).	  	  44	  John	  Galaty	  (1993),	  in	  Being	  Maasai,	  is	  largely	  concerned	  with	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  Maasai	  identity	  formed.	  In	  particular,	  Galaty	  suggests	  that	  their	  pattern	  of	  “inclusiveness	  and	  exclusiveness,	  and	  discrimination	  and	  opportunistic	  openness”	  support	  the	  contention	  that	  Maasai	  were	  ethnic	  “shifters.”	  (See	  pages	  174-­‐176	  for	  fuller	  discussion.);	  See	  edited	  volume	  by	  Thomas	  Spear	  and	  Richard	  Waller,	  eds.,	  
Being	  Maasai:	  	  Ethnicity	  &	  Identity	  in	  East	  Africa	  (London:	  James	  Currey,	  Ltd),	  1993.	  	  45	  Waller,	  1984,	  p.	  243.	  46	  Robert	  A.	  Blewett,	  “Property	  Rights	  as	  a	  Cause	  of	  the	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons:	  	  Institutional	  Change	  and	  the	  Pastoral	  Maasai	  of	  Kenya,”	  Eastern	  Economic	  Journal,	  Vol.	  21,	  No.	  4,	  Fall	  1995.	  	  47	  See	  for	  instance,	  Richard	  D.	  Waller,	  “Interaction	  and	  Identity	  on	  the	  Periphery:	  	  the	  Trans-­‐Mara	  Maasai,”	  The	  International	  Journal	  of	  African	  Historical	  Studies,	  17,	  no.	  2	  (1984):	  243-­‐284;	  Blewett,	  1995.	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essential to their collective survival, especially in times of great stress.48 Throughout 
the pre-colonial period, the Maasai developed a prosperous and stable way of life, 
and made use of their natural resources in sustainable and ecologically sound ways 
that ensured the continuation of their pastoral culture.  
 This history is internalized by contemporary Maasai who stated to me that 
they, more than other ethnic communities, have been more accommodating to 
individuals outside of their ethnic group by sharing their land and resources, and 
engaging in trade. In particular, several interlocutors and acquaintances referenced 
the historical relationship once held between the Maasai and the Kikuyu—one that 
was considered integral to the maintenance of peace and stability throughout 
Maasailand. The historical narrative provided by my acquaintances and 
interlocutors is supported by the literature which suggests that during the pre-
colonial period the Maasai were neither marginalized nor isolated. Rather, they 
distinguished themselves in terms of pre-colonial social organization by bringing 
together disparate groups into a cooperative, symbiotic system of shared resources, 
skills, and identity.49  
 
2.3 Colonial Disruptions to Maasai Society 
 The openness of Maasai society and their entrepreneurial spirit and 
willingness to embrace other groups also facilitated early encounters with European 
travelers in East Africa in the mid-nineteenth century. The Maasai made entry into 
European consciousness through travel accounts which first personified the Maasai 
as the deft and regal ‘warrior.’  Yet, as encounters between the Maasai and European 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Galaty,	  1993,	  p.	  192;	  W.	  Ng’ang’a,	  2006,	  pp.	  393-­‐407.	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travelers increased, and as popular demands for tantalizing accounts of European 
adventures in Africa spawned an industry of fictionalized travelogues, the Maasai 
were increasingly cast as ferocious, arrogant and untamable “beasts.” It is 
remarkable the extent to which these stereotypical portrayals of the ‘natives’ would 
come to define the Maasai in the eyes of Europeans. In particular, Scottish writer-
explorer Joseph Thompson’s sexually-charged and violent accounts of his travels 
through Maasai territory in the mid-19th century helped to create an enduring image 
of the roving, violent Maasai warrior—an image that would later be used to justify 
the colonial policy of forced relocation of Maasai communities and massive land 
stealing.50  It should be noted that the emergent image of the Maasai warrior was not 
confined to contemporary national boundaries, as the Maasai ‘nation’ extended from 
southern Kenya into the northern regions of Tanzania.  
  Much like other pastoral and indigenous people, the Maasai’s concept of 
land did not privilege individualized notion of land ownership. Collective  
management of communal resources and strategic cooperation with other pastoral 
groups and agriculturalists were essential to the survival of the Maasai way of life. 
As such, customs and practices that reinforced cooperation and communalism were 
built into the very fabric of Maasai society.  Yet, from the ethnocentric, hegemonic 
perspective of the nineteenth century colonial mindset, these traits were indicative 
of primitive thinking, and as such were anachronistic to modern concepts of 
development, which for the British largely meant shifting toward settled, 
agricultural economies. 51  Indeed, the colonial perception was that the Maasai 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Lotte	  Hughes,	  Moving	  the	  Maasai:	  A	  Colonial	  Misadventure	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillian,	  2006),	  p.	  272.	  51	  Peter	  J.	  Schraeder,	  African	  Politics	  and	  Society:	  A	  Mosaic	  in	  Transformation	  (Belmont:	  Wadsworth,	  1995);	  Blewett,	  1995,	  pp.	  482-­‐483.	  
	   	   23	  
pastoral lands were greatly underutilized, if not entirely ‘unsettled’ and available for 
colonial use.52   
 Land and conflict over its use became central to the relationship between the 
Maasai and their colonizers. First, the establishment of the Anglo-German Boundary 
between the countries of Kenya and Tanzania during the period of 1886-1890 
divided the Maasai nation and cut off southern trade routes and pastoral lands 
previously controlled by the Maasai.53  Even so, by 1890 the Maasai still maintained 
an expansive territory extending north-south along the Great Rift Valley in Kenya.54  
While the making of national boundaries greatly restricted Maasai movement, 
according to historian Lotte Hughes, it was the completion of the Uganda Railway in 
1901 that ultimately “sealed the fate of the Maasai.” The railway—built as a vital 
artery connecting the Kenyan coast to Lake Victoria in Uganda—ran directly 
through Maasai territory, setting the stage for increased conflict between the Maasai 
pastoralists and Europeans. In particular, Hughes notes, the railway altered the 
Maasai pastoral lands by slicing “their territory in two” and opening the fertile 
highlands surrounding Nairobi to European settlement and economic 
development.55  Notably, this area is still referred to as the ‘White Highlands’ even 
today. (Figure 2.1 illustrates the changes taking place in Maasai territory during this 
period.)56 
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Figure 2.1 (Source: Hughes 2006) 
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 Conflicts between Maasai pastoralists and Europeans increased during this 
period of intense settlement, particularly over access to the highlands region which 
served as an important pasturage for the Maasai during the dry season. These 
conflicts made it ever more urgent for the colonial administration to permanently 
relocate the Maasai and control their movement. The passage of the Order in 
Council in 1901 provided the colonial administrators the power they so desperately 
sought to enable them to ‘legally’ alienate lands in the Kenyan colony on behalf of 
the British crown.57  
 
2.3.1 Anglo-Maasai Treaties of 1904 and 1911   
 At the turn of the century, the Maasai were still a formidable group despite 
their previous encounters with colonial oppression. Their reputation as capable 
warriors, and allegiance to one another, suggested that outright combat was not the 
best option for securing  pristine  grazing lands. Instead, the colonial administrators 
opted for a negotiated settlement which would provide permanent land to the 
Maasai, with “guaranteed property rights,” while securing lands suitable for 
agricultural development for European settlers. 58  In doing so, the colonial 
government took advantage of the fact that Maasai society did not operate on rigid 
hierarchical or authoritarian governing structures. Rather than approaching each 
clan individually, the negotiators for the British appointed several Maasai elders, on 
whom they bestowed decision making authority to represent all Maasai clans.  Of 
course, the British colonial administrators possessed an incredible advantage 
compared to the illiterate Maasai representatives, who through coercion and 	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subterfuge ‘agreed’ to the first treaty (in 1904). This treaty ultimately divided the 
Maasai people in two, forcing a small group northward into the Laikipia plains, 
while a larger group was forced into the harsher, semi-arid lands south of the 
Ugandan Railway, a region that would later become Kajiado District. 59  Under the 
1904 treaties, the Maasai were promised unbroken ownership of these lands “for so 
long as the Masai (sic) as a race shall exist.” 60  However, with the expansion of 
European settlements into the temperate and fertile lands of the Laikipia plains, the 
British colonial government forced the negotiation of a second treaty in 1911 that 
would relocate the northern Maasai to an expanded area in the south, now officially 
called the Southern Reserve.61  By the time the second treaty was signed there was 
great unrest within the Maasai community because of the hardships they suffered 
during the early moves. The loss of more than half of Maasai territory to the 
European settler class, and increasing hardships due to the unfavorable 
environmental conditions of the southern reserve, greatly stressed the Maasai 
pastoralists.62 There were also growing fractures within Maasai society, particularly 
between the younger ilmurran (warrior class) and the elders. The youth increasingly 
felt that the elders had jeopardized their future, and the future of their children, by 
submitting to the colonial desires for the best lands. It is not surprising that a 
generational conflict emerged during this period. Indeed, disrupting the power of 
the ilmurran was a central strategy of the colonial government bent on undermining 
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factions within Maasai society they viewed as most threatening to the colonial 
project.  
 Early in the colonial period, administrators identified the ilmurran as the 
“bulwark” against full assimilation of the Maasai people into the ‘modern’ colonial 
social and economic culture.  Thus it was deemed necessary to  disrupt the age-set 
ceremonies which were designed to maintain the warrior class system as a way to  
‘tame’ the Maasai and bring them into line with the colonial ideals of a civilized race. 
Tignor (1972) suggests that there is evidence that some Maasai elders even agreed to 
hasten the ceremonial advancement of ilmurran into junior elderhood—a time when 
‘warriors’ were encouraged to settle and marry. 63   In essence, the colonial 
government’s intention was to surreptitiously engineer a shift in the balance of 
power away from the warrior age-set to the elders, who were believed to be more 
accommodating to the social reforms and institutional changes proposed by the 
colonial government. Tignor (1972) writes: 
The goal of Hemsted’s programme was to limit the military 
capacity of the junior warriors; this was to be done by 
disarming them, hastening the E-Unoto ceremony, at which 
time they settle down and became senior warriors, and by 
disbanding warrior manyattas, where, according to 
Hemsted, young men lived free from the control of elders 
and conceived their plans of raiding and opposing 
government policies. 64   
 
 
 Though the elders were able to enforce obedience during the move of 1904, 
growing discontent among the youth led a small group of Maasai in 1913 to bring a 
civil case against the colonial government and Maasai signatories to the Anglo-
Maasai treaties. The Maasai plaintiffs claimed that the treaties were void, among 	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other reasons, because the vast majority of their people did not consent to the 
agreements. The plaintiffs also argued that the signatories to the treaties were 
arbitrarily selected by the colonial government to represent all Maasai, even though  
these individuals actually held no legitimate administrative responsibility or 
executive power within the Maasai community. 65  Specifically, the youth argued 
that the elders only possessed the authority to counsel ilmurran, but did not 
themselves have decision-making authority in Maasai society. Therefore, in the eyes 
of the plaintiffs and the Maasai masses who they represented, the treaties lacked  
legitimacy as the process by which they were created was inconsistent with local 
customs.66  
 The British Crown countered by arguing that colonial administrators had the 
authority and discretion under British law to determine with whom the Crown 
could enter agreement, regardless of the social customs of the Maasai. The Crown 
also claimed that since British East Africa was not actually British territory, the 
Maasai were not British subjects and therefore did not have any “attendant rights of 
access to British law.” 67  Not surprisingly, the colonial High Court at Mombasa 
agreed with the defendants (i.e., the British Crown) and dismissed the civil case on 
May 26, 1913 on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ claims were not recognizable in 
municipal courts and because the treaties were actually “Acts of State.” The case was 
then referred to the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa in December 1913 where the 
decision of the lower court was predictably upheld.68   
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 In the immediate aftermath of the 1913 court rulings, the Maasai were 
permanently evicted from the northern territory. While the loss of this land dealt a 
devastating blow to the collective psyche of the Maasai, the long-term repercussions 
cannot be underestimated. As suggested by Hughes (2006), this ordeal resulted in 
widespread feelings of “distrust and alienation” among the Maasai in the early 20th 
century.  As a result, the Maasai retreated further from the colonial state in part by 
resisting assimilation into the system of colonial education; a decision, which may 
have contributed to the Maasai community’s marginalization and descent into 
poverty in comparison to other groups.69   
 Oral testimonies collected in the course of this study also suggest that these 
events represent an important part of the Maasai history of social mobilization and 
political identity formation in two ways. First, demands for comprehensive redress 
of this historic injustice remain a central component of contemporary political claims 
made by Maasai in Kenya. Second, the Maasai argue that the illegal appropriation of 
pastoral lands for agricultural settlement during the colonial period, in total 
disregard for the Maasai way of life, was indicative of a growing bias against their 
livelihood—a bias that was perpetuated in the post-colonial era. For many Maasai 
with whom I spoke, the bias against pastoralism is even more problematic than the 
original land loss because of its use by post-colonial governments as a rationale for 
development schemes in Maasailand which privilege agriculture and the 
individuation of land into increasingly smaller plots.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Hughes,	  2006,	  p.	  174.	  
	   	   30	  
 2.3.2 Disruptions to Pastoralism under Colonial Rule 
 Despite the relocation to the harsher Southern Reserve, and the loss of more 
than half of the Maasai’s original territory, it is believed that by 1910 the Maasai still 
maintained large numbers of livestock, and could have been well positioned 
economically if they were allowed entry into the colonial economy. Yet this was not 
the case. Colonial policies continued to discriminate against pastoralism by 
introducing costly quarantine regulations and authorizing white settlements just 
north of the Southern Reserve. The geographic restrictions imposed by these 
settlements cut the Maasai off from important trade routes, particularly to Somalia, 
where they acquired livestock for breeding. Historically, trade with pastoralists in 
Somalia was crucial for the Maasai to maintain stronger and more genetically 
diverse herds.70   
 Remarkably, despite these restrictions, Maasai herds remained healthy and 
continued to grow. However, by the 1920s and 1930s, concerns about overstocking 
of cattle, and perceived threats to the European cattle industry, led the British 
colonial government to impose further restrictions on the pastoral practices of the  
Maasai, including the selling of cattle. King (1971) provides evidence of such policies 
as described in colonial correspondence written by the District Commissioner in 
Narok:  
So far as this District is concerned he [the Maasai] is 
forbidden by law to sell his stock however much he may 
want to…Folks may talk of the useless Masai (sic). But the 
fact is that they are forbidden to help the Colony in the way 
which they best could, that is by supplying cheap beef.71  	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 Pastoralism in the pre-colonial period prospered under conditions which 
supported vast social networks, reliable trade, cooperative management of 
communal grazing lands and water supplies.72  Under colonial rule, the relegation of 
Maasai to the ‘reserves’, and increasingly to smaller, individualized parcels of land 
restricted the size and geographic range of Maasai social organization and stressed 
pastoral life.  The containment of Maasai pastoral ranges, and colonial policies 
which limited their entry into the economy imposed great economic hardships on 
the Maasai. By the 1930s, many Maasai clans such as the Purko were forced into 
wage labor in the construction sector in order to pay new colonial taxes. Tignor 
suggests that participating in the construction of colonial roads must have been 
particularly demoralizing for the Maasai, given that the building of this 
infrastructure through Maasailand was considered one of the most nefarious and 
disruptive of all modernizing intrusions into the Maasai pastoral lands. 73 
 It is noteworthy that the Maasai were not the only community to lose land 
during the colonial period. Yet, the geographic restrictions imposed by the ‘closed’ 
Southern Reserve stressed the Maasai people who traditionally were able (and 
willing) to relocate to accommodate the movement of other groups. The boundaries 
of the reserves also contributed to increased hostility between Maasai and other 
groups, particularly the Kikuyu, who began to encroach on the Maasai reserve after 
the loss of their own prime agricultural lands to the British.  Some scholars suggest 
that this period of intensifying conflict between ethnic groups greatly influenced the 
development of the contemporary Maasai political identity, particularly as land 	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pressures increased and the concept of property rights, imposed by the British, 
forced the Maasai to compete with other ethnic groups for access to, and 
‘ownership’ of land. 74 
 
2.4  Maasai Social Mobilization during the Negotiation of Independence     
 Between 1932-1962, the boundaries of the Maasai community began to 
crystalize around a defined political constituency.  During this period, the Maasai 
submitted a series of legal petitions to the colonial Land Commission and the British 
Government, seeking redress for the land loss in 1904 and 1911, including the 
reestablishment of the lands in the highlands around Nairobi. 75  In the early 1950s, 
as Kenya’s independence became a certainty, the Maasai United Front (MUF), a 
quasi-political bloc, was established to advance Maasai demands during the 
negotiation of the independence constitution.76 Of principal concern to the Maasai 
was the reconstitution of their original lands, and assurances that the Maasai people, 
as a minority ethnic group, would have autonomy in the administration of their 
customary social, economic and political institutions. It is crucial to remember that 
under colonial rule the government became “the driver of accumulation” of 
resources and political power.77 Control over the state emerged therefore as a central 
concern of the politics surrounding the negotiation of independence in the 1950s and 
early 1960s.78  Social organization during this period also took on the character of 
uneven development fostered under colonial rule which “magnified” ethnic 	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inequalities and ethnic-based competition.79  For the Maasai, as well as other ethnic 
minority communities, fears that the larger, wealthier, and more powerful ethnic 
groups would dominate the post-colonial state led to preoccupation with 
maintaining ethnic autonomy through the establishment of a governing structure 
composed of ethnically-defined, autonomous regional administrative units—often 
known as majimboism. 
 The negotiation of independence was a defining period for the Maasai 
community. Their political alliance with the KADU party in 1960 brought together 
minority groups in the Rift Valley and the Coast region, as well as ironically, white 
settlers who joined KADU under the belief that a regional system would protect 
European privilege in post-colonial Kenya. 80  The KANU party, which was a 
coalition of the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic communities (led by Kenya’s first President, 
Jomo Kenyatta) rejected KADU’s calls for majimboism as nothing more than 
tribalism. Instead, under the guise of nationalism, the KANU party sought a strong, 
centralized system of government which brought the regions under the control of a 
robust national government.   
 Though KANU defeated KADU in the 1961 elections, increasing international 
pressure during the Lancaster House talks in 1961 forced KANU to accept a 
compromise with the minority communities composing KADU. Under the 
leadership of Daniel Arap Moi, KADU argued that majimboism ensured the 
continued influence of minority ethnic communities in independent Kenya.  During 
these talks, KANU acquiesced to KADU’s desire for a decentralized system of 
government by promising to consider the establishment of regional assemblies once 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Ibid.	  80	  David	  Anderson.	  “‘Yours	  in	  Struggle	  for	  Majimbo’.	  Nationalism	  and	  the	  Party	  Politics	  of	  Decolonization	  in	  Kenya,	  1955-­‐1964,”	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  History,	  40	  (2005),	  547-­‐564.	  
	   	   34	  
the central government was formed, and to participate in an interim coalition 
government with KADU.81  Despite these promises, once the Lancaster House Talks 
concluded and KANU leaders gauged the political climate to be in their favor, they 
reneged on its agreement with the minority-led KADU party.  In reality, KADU 
itself was divided over how best to implement a regional government structure, and 
was subsequently politically weaker than the majority-led KANU. Yet, the public 
dismissal of KADU’s majimboist platform by Jomo Kenyatta and other KANU 
leaders and the move to cast this development as part of an anti-national tribalist 
agenda swiftly undermined any remaining political power wielded by KADU 
leaders.82  KANU would go on to win the 1963 national elections, with Jomo 
Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, as the first president of independent Kenya.  
 
2.5 Maasai in the Post-Colonial Kenya 
  The collapse of the Lancaster House agreement and the dismissal of the 
concerns of minority ethnic groups over the allocation of political power within the 
framework of the post-colonial state still linger today.  As one activist confided, 
many Maasai leaders are “still very bitter” that the majority groups reneged on their 
agreement to support a political arrangement that would give minority groups 
stronger voice in the government, noting that “these are the very issues of 
representation and inclusion that we still face in the present day Kenya.”83  
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2.5.1 Bias Against Pastoralism and Land Reforms 
 Independence offered a crucial moment for Kenyans to reflect upon their 
shared history and reject the colonial institutions and ideologies of power and 
patronage. However, in Kenya, as in many post-colonial African nations, the 
colonial institutions were not abandoned but rather reinforced by African leaders in 
the immediate post-colonial period. Of particular concern to Maasai leaders was the 
persistence of colonial attitudes which stigmatized pastoralism and pushed the 
Maasai further to the margins of society. The colonial ideology of development 
which privileged sedentary agricultural production and individuation of land was 
exploited by Kenya’s first political leaders to justify the appropriation of ‘idle’ 
pastoral lands by the government after independence.84 The system of political 
patronage amplified inequalities between the majority and minority ethnic groups 
and, in doing so, further alienated the Maasai.  
 In particular, sweeping land reforms implemented in the 1960s awarded large 
swaths of land to communities and individuals who supported the KANU party. 
This affected the Maasai directly in two ways.  First, the few Maasai that were given 
access to land were either educated or had served in the colonial administration, and 
were considered ‘progressive’ by the Kenyatta government. 85  Second, the 
government’s land reforms involved the practice of dividing Maasai ranches into 
individualized parcels which were viewed as more suitable for the emerging 
economy.  This rapid individuation of land, and selective allocation of land to 
‘privileged’ individuals was inimical to traditional cultural practices that once 
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fostered unity and cooperation among the Maasai.  One of my interlocutors 
involved in mobilizing the Maasai community in the early 1970s commented: 
The Maasai people had very little expectation that the 
post-independence government could meet their 
needs, or solve their problems….people saw the 
government as an entity to control and direct their 
lives. They did not trust the government or power.86 
   
 During this period several Maasai leaders, including William Ntimama, rose 
to power within the community. 87  According to one of my interlocutors who was 
politically active during this time, there was a precipitous change in the Maasai 
community in the early 1980s. I further learned that local social movements, some 
sponsored by the Catholic Diocese’s DELTA “liberation education” program, were 
mobilizing and empowering Maasai in the southern Rift Valley.88 As a result, the 
Maasai community as a whole was becoming less fearful of government, more 
organized, and more empowered to engage in national political debates. As one 
activist said, by the 1980s “Maasai in the villages were becoming more critical of the 
government and asking questions at public meetings.”89  
 
2.5.2 Boundary Making and the Issue of Land in the Post-Independence Era 
 However, the problems of boundary making in the colonial period were 
compounded under new schemes to demarcate land at the end of colonial rule. 
Several transformations which occurred during this period affected the Maasai 	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specifically. First, as noted previously, the system of political patronage established 
under colonial rule was perpetuated by Kenya’s new African leaders who awarded 
large swaths of prime land to supporters of the KANU political party, including 
lands that were once held by the Maasai. Second, the creation of national parks in 
Maasai territory of the southern Rift Valley increased land pressure and restricted 
access to vital grazing areas and water sources. Finally, increasing interest in 
securing private land tenure, and the push by the government to convert once 
communally held lands into private ownership, led to a rise in illegal land schemes 
throughout Kenya. The Maasai were exploited during this period because of the 
high rate of illiteracy, unfamiliarity with land titling policy and limited access to 
legal representation. A 2002 report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on the 
Land Law System (commonly referred to as the Njonjo report) and the 2004 report 
of the Presidential Commission into the Irregular-Illegal Allocation of Public Lands 
(Ndungu report) indicate that the most widespread abuse of land titling and 
arbitrary displacement of original inhabitants occurred in the Kajiado area of the Rift 
Valley, principally Maasailand. 90 
  The Maasai also claim that in addition to land settlement schemes which 
dispossessed them of their land, they were never compensated for their land loss 
under British colonial rule. Specifically, part of the Settlement Transfer Fund (STF) 
agreed to by the British government at the time of independence was intended to 
rectify the land issue for the Maasai by providing financial compensation to the 
Kenyan government to be shared with communities aggrieved by land loss during 	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the colonial period. However, the Maasai argue that President Kenyatta used the 
funds to settle landless people from other communities (primarily supporters of his 
presidency) while ignoring the Maasai. 91  
 During the term of Kenya’s second president Daniel Arap Moi (1978-2002), a 
Kalenjin, the Maasai became more active and strategic in their social mobilization by 
uniting with other pastoral groups in a multiethnic coalition called Kamatusa.  This 
alliance, composed of the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu communities, 
was formed primarily to unite opposition against perceived dominance of the 
Kikuyu and encroachment of Kikuyu settlements on the Rift Valley on which 
Kamatusa communities laid claims. 92  Interestingly, leaders of the larger ethnic 
communities characterized Kamatusa as nothing more than a “platform for political 
exclusion,” much in the same way the majimboist platform had been portrayed as 
‘tribalism.’93  
 In the early 1990s, tension over land ownership led to the eruption of 
ethnically-motivated violence in the Rift Valley; some of this violence involved the 
Maasai. However, the intensification of ethnic conflict birthed a more moderate 
coalition of Maasai nationalists who rose to power in an attempt to negotiate 
reconciliation between Maasai pastoralists and the Kikuyu and rectify the 
longstanding land claims held by the Maasai people. Yet, despite several 
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conferences between leaders from the Maasai and Kikuyu communities, conflict 
continued in the Rift Valley throughout the 1990s and the Moi era.94  
 
2.5.3 The 2004 Protest Movement 
 As President Mwai Kibaki’s NARC regime came to power in 2002, the Maasai 
viewed the new political dispensation as an opportunity to gain greater access to 
resources and power.95  In the lead up to the hundredth anniversary of the 1904 
Anglo-Maasai treaty, the Maa Civil Society Forum—an informal association of 
diverse non-governmental organizations and community leaders—in collaboration 
with Maasai activists and other pastoral groups began organizing a strategy to 
engage the new government. Led by a cadre of professional lawyers and activists, 
the goal was to create a sustainable movement capable of confronting the 
government with “peaceful and legal claims for the redress of historic injustices, 
particularly the return of Maasai ancestral lands.”96  The movement sought to 
elevate the concerns of Maasai pastoralists through strategic media events, high 
profile fundraising, and the creation of legal positions based on intensive research 
into the legitimacy of land claims made by minority groups dispossessed during the 
first few decades of Kenya’s independence. It is noteworthy that research by legal 
experts uncovered the existence of companies from other parts of the country 
involved in illegal land schemes in Laikipia (and other Maasai lands). As one activist 
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noted, the movement engaged in activities that “were threatening to expose the 
‘Africanization of the White Highlands’” by the Kikuyu elite. 97  
  During this period of intense political activism, there was growing concern 
among Kenyans outside of the Maasai community about who had the right to land 
and resources, and what such a social movement might mean in terms of changing 
policy paradigms and public opinion on what is considered ‘rightful’ or ‘ancestral’ 
lands.98 As it became clearer that the Maasai were organizing to petition the Kenyan 
government for inclusive land reforms by exposing the country’s ugly history of 
land graft, the social movement and its leaders became prime targets of the state.  In 
August 2004, on the 100th anniversary of the signing of the 1904 Anglo-Maasai 
treaties, large sections of Maasai civil society united in peaceful protests in Nairobi 
near the Kenyatta International Conference Center and the British High 
Commission. The group intended to deliver petitions to the Kenyan government 
calling for resettlement of Maasai on lands illegally taken away from them through 
the Anglo-Maasai treaties. 99 
 Maasai protestors numbering in the hundreds marched through Nairobi to 
the Ministry of Lands and Settlement Offices where they attempted to deliver a 
petition to Minister Amos Kimunya entitled, “A Memorandum on Anglo-Maasai 
Agreements: A Case of Historical and Contemporary Injustices and Dispossession of 
Maasai Lands.” Simultaneously, Maasai groups held similar demonstrations in 
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Kajiado, Naivasha, and Ngong, where copies of the memo were delivered to local  
and provincial government authorities.  100  
  At the time of the protests, a three-year drought threatened to decimate the 
livestock holdings of the Laikipia Maasai, and the sudden drying of once-reliable 
water sources was forcing  local pastoralists to walk upwards of eight hours a day in 
search of water for their livestock. 101 A few years earlier, a similar drought had led 
the government to intervene by allowing the Maasai to graze their livestock on the 
slopes of Mount Kenya, instead of the neighboring lush ranches held by a handful of 
large-scale land owners. Sadly, the harsh weather conditions of Mount Kenya 
proved too difficult and the Maasai lost many hundreds of their livestock to the 
cold, wet conditions.102  
 During this period a drought emergency had been declared in 26 of Kenya’s 
74 districts, rendering 2.3 million Kenyans in need of relief aid. 103  As the 
international community began to respond to the humanitarian crisis, the growing 
insecurity had considerably stressed the already tenuous relationship between the 
Maasai and large-scale ranchers in many areas of the country. 104 Aggrieved by the 
government’s negligence to address their long-standing issues, hundreds of herders 
moved onto private ranches in what the government quickly characterized as illegal 
land invasions. As tensions elevated, Dr. Chris Murunguru, Kenya’s National 	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Security Minister, made public appeals to the National Assembly and Maasai 
political leaders to end the invasions that “threatened to spark hostilities” between 
the Maasai and ranch owners. 105 Subsequently, the government dispatched tactical 
police squads, including the paramilitary General Service Unit and Anti-Stock Theft 
Unit, to end the protests.   Reports by human rights groups and news outlets 
documented massive detention of  Maasai pastoralists, including women and 
children. The situation was compounded by the routine torching and looting of 
Maasai homes and illegal seizure of hundreds of cattle, sheep and goats. 106 
 Activists who participated in political mobilization during the early years of 
the Kibaki regime suggest that the aggressive suppression by the government 
severely weakened the Maasai social movement, and reinforced entrenched thinking 
in government circles that the Maasai should be permanently pushed to the margins 
of society.  It is noteworthy that prejudice against pastoralists emerged once again 
during this critical period, as the Maasai were portrayed as nothing more than 
“economic saboteurs out to stop the tourism sector from recovery.”107  Following the 
protests, the architecture of the social movement was systematically dismantled by 
the government through targeted intimidation of Maasai organizations. Ultimately, 
this led to the deportation of three foreign workers employed by pro-Maasai non-
governmental organizations, and the loss of the movement’s national coordinator, 
Ben ole Koissaba, who sought political asylum in the United States after being forced 	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to leave Kenya.108 While historically the Maasai had not engaged in direct ‘rebellion’ 
or been involved in violence against the state, the 2004 protests marked a precipitous 
change in their social movement, becoming better organized and more strategic in 
its tactics.109   
  
2.5.4 Maasai and the Constitutional Reform under Kibaki 
 The refusal of President Kibaki to follow through on power sharing 
agreements with the Liberal Democratic Party throughout his first term fueled 
increasing antagonism against his Kikuyu-led government. Of particular concern to 
Kenyans was the growing inequality between urban and rural regions—a concern  
amplified by a report released in 2004 which highlighted the ethnic dimensions of  
inequality in Kenya. In the words of the authors, “urban areas and the Kikuyu 
districts had superior economic and social indicators as a result of high levels of 
patronage from previous governments that discriminated against less-developed 
regions.”110 Under mounting pressure from the public and political opposition, 
President Kibaki reluctantly agreed to a constitutional review process and the 
drafting of a new constitution in 2004.  
 The resultant Bomas Draft Constitution (sometimes called the People’s 
Constitution) called for devolution of government power to the districts and an 
increase in local development budgets.  The Maasai were generally supportive of the 
Bomas initiative because they felt that it provided for equitable distribution of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Interlocutor	  E.	  	  109	  Kantai,	  2007;	  ole	  Ndaskoi,	  2006;	  also	  see	  Minorities	  at	  Risk	  Project,	  	  Assessment	  for	  Maasai	  in	  Kenya,	  2006	  on	  the	  historical	  nature	  of	  Maasai	  protests,	  accessed	  at	  www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=50105.	  110	  See	  Michael	  Chege,	  “Kenya:	  Back	  from	  the	  Brink?,”	  Journal	  of	  Democracy,	  vol.	  19,	  4	  (2008):	  125-­‐139,	  which	  references	  a	  report	  issued	  by	  the	  Society	  for	  International	  Development	  (SID),	  entitled,	  “Pulling	  apart:	  Facts	  and	  figures	  on	  inequality	  in	  Kenya.”	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resources in “indigenous and minorities’ lands and territories” and called for the 
formation of a commission to investigate historic injustices experienced by many of 
Kenya’s minority communities.111  However, despite support from other ethnic 
minority groups and Kenya’s major political parties, President Kibaki rejected the 
draft constitution on the grounds that it provided too much authority to the local 
level and weakened national control over economic development. It is also 
suggested that the Kibaki government was heavily influenced by its relationship 
with foreign investors, including the United States, who opposed the draft because it 
weakened opportunities for foreign companies seeking access to natural resources in 
Kenya by encouraging the redistribution of land, resources and power to the local 
level. 112 
 A second draft of the constitution introduced by Attorney General Amos 
Wako, sought to build a compromise between the Kibaki government and its 
opponents. The so-called Wako Draft created a two tier government with a prime 
minister nominated by the President. For many smaller ethnic groups, however, the 
danger of the Wako Draft was its proposal to create a National Land Commission to 
be headed by an administrator solely appointed by the President. The Maasai of 
southern Kajiado, in particular, objected to the Wako Draft on grounds that it would 
unfairly redistribute revenue derived from natural resources.  Many Maasai  felt that 
the system of even distribution would further “facilitate abuse” and “marginalize” 
the Maasai by appropriating revenue from natural resources in their lands to other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Michael	  ole	  Tiampati,	  “Maasai	  Wary	  of	  Draft	  Constitution	  Backed	  by	  Government,”	  Cultural	  Survival,	  November	  4,	  2005,	  accessed	  on	  September	  18,	  2012	  at	  http://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/micahel-­‐ole-­‐tiampati/maasai	  -­‐wary-­‐draft-­‐constitution-­‐backed-­‐government.	  112	  Leigh	  Brownhill,	  and	  Terisa	  Turner,	  “The	  struggle	  for	  land	  and	  food	  sovereignty:	  Feminism	  in	  the	  Mau	  Mau	  resurgence,”	  IN	  Globalization	  and	  Third	  World	  Women:	  Exploitation,	  Coping	  and	  Resistance,	  Ligaya	  Lindio-­‐McGovern,	  Valliman,	  I.	  (eds.),	  2009.	  Surrey,	  England:	  	  Ashgate	  Publishing.	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ethnic communities. 113 Other Maasai did not trust any commission established by 
the Kibaki regime, which they regarded as little more than “a ruse through which 
Kikuyu would grab their pastures.”114 Not surprisingly, the Wako Draft, which  
contained no recommendation on the curtailment of presidential power, was 
rejected by a referendum in 2005. Kibaki’s recalcitrance on constitutional reform and 
his insistence on concentrating power in the presidency forced the leaders of the 
major opposition parties to unite in the newly formed Orange Democratic Party 
(ODM), led by Raila Odinga. 
 The 2004-2005 debate over constitutional reform deepened the divide 
between the Kikuyu and the other ethnic groups. In the lead up to the December 
2007 national elections, Kibaki reconstituted his coalition in the newly formed Party 
of National Unity (PNU), which included members of the KANU. 115 Raila Odinga, a 
Luo leader of ODM, the main opposition party, was the primary spokesperson for 
many ethnic minority voters who insisted on a new constitution that would grant 
greater political and fiscal autonomy to local governments. As before, Kibaki 
criticized Odinga’s platform as a tribalist agenda aimed at dividing Kenya along 
ethnic lines. 116 Ultimately, both leaders were forced to seek votes outside their 
ethnic groups in order to broaden their political bases. Even so, both candidates 
continued to accuse each other of “using tribal appeals while boasting of their own 
multi-ethnic credentials.”117  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  Ibid.	  114	  Chege,	  M.	  2008,	  p.	  132.	  	  115	  Clark	  C.	  Gibson	  and	  James	  D.	  Long,	  “The	  presidential	  and	  parliamentary	  elections	  in	  Kenya,	  December	  	  2007,”	  Electoral	  Studies	  (2009):	  	  1-­‐6,	  accessed	  on	  September	  18,	  2012	  at	  www.elseviere.com/locate/elecstud.	  	  116	  Ibid,	  p.	  2.	  117	  Ibid,	  p.	  3.	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2.6  2007 Elections and Ethnic Conflict in Kenya 
In December 2007, what began as heated, but relatively routine elections, 
culminated in one of the deadliest incidents of political violence in post-
independence Kenya.118  Irregularities in vote counting, which was attributed to the 
inefficiency of the Election Commission, coupled with the hasty swearing in of 
Kibaki, gave rise to the most acute incident of ethnically-motivated violence in years. 
In a matter of only a few weeks, the ensuing nation-wide violence  resulted in more 
than 1,130 deaths and thousands of serious injuries, widespread destruction of 
property, and the displacement of more than 300,000 Kenyan citizens. Gross 
violations of human rights, including forced circumcision of Luo men and boys, and 
rape of women, were documented by the Commission of Inquiry established in May 
2007 to investigate the cause of the post-election violence.119  While most of the 
perpetrators were from the Luo and Kikuyu ethnic groups, it is widely suspected 
that prominent political leaders were responsible for instigating violence. In 2010, 
the International Criminal Court charged several leading political figures for their 
role in fueling the violence by uttering hate speech and encouraging their supporters 
and the police to assault political opponents.120,121 And, according to the CIPEV, at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Kenya	  also	  saw	  ethnically-­‐motivated	  violence	  throughout	  the	  1990s.	  While	  the	  post-­‐election	  violence	  in	  the	  weeks	  following	  the	  2007	  presidential	  election	  in	  many	  ways	  resembled	  the	  militia	  violence	  of	  the	  1990s,	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  Post-­‐Election	  Violence	  (CIPEV)	  concluded	  that	  the	  “violence	  that	  shook	  Kenya	  after	  the	  2007	  general	  elections	  was	  unprecedented.	  It	  was	  by	  far	  the	  most	  deadly	  and	  destructive	  violence	  ever	  experienced	  in	  Kenya.”	  The	  Commission	  was	  initiated	  on	  May	  23,	  2007	  following	  an	  announcement	  in	  the	  Kenya	  Gazette	  Notice	  No.	  4473	  vol.	  cx-­‐no.4.	  	  A	  copy	  of	  the	  report	  may	  be	  found	  at	  www.cipev.org.	  Quote	  taken	  from	  summary	  found	  at	  http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/kenya-­‐commission-­‐inquiry-­‐post-­‐election-­‐violence-­‐cipev-­‐final-­‐report.	  119	  Ibid.	  120	  Ibid.	  	  121	  The	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  is	  currently	  pursuing	  cases	  against	  three	  prominent	  Kenyan	  politicians	  and	  leaders	  in	  Kenya’s	  government	  for	  crimes	  against	  humanity.	  	  These	  individuals	  include	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least 405 deaths resulting from gunshots are believed to have been perpetrated by 
police.  
Notably, there was no indication that the Maasai played a significant role in 
the post-election violence. The CIPEV reported only one Maasai fatality. While 
demographic data of the official vote count is not available, exit polls show that 
Raila Odinga was favored by the Maasai over the incumbent Mwai Kibaki by a 
margin of 14.4 points, having received 56.0% of the Maasai vote.122 Exit polling also 
indicate that voters who chose Kibaki generally had a positive evaluation of the 
economy. On the other hand, voters who favored Odinga were more concerned 
about the growing inequality and corruption in government and/or had a generally 
negative evaluation of the economy.123   
In the months before the election, acquaintances in the Maasai community 
expressed similar sentiments about the economic situation. Those who favored 
Odinga generally cited the fact that his platform stressed poverty alleviation,  
limiting the power of the presidency,  greater autonomy for local governments, and 
promised to aggressively fight corruption and political patronage. It is noteworthy 
that there was almost universal support for Odinga and the ODM platform among 
the Maasai I spoke with in the rural areas of Kajiado District in late 2007.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  William	  Samoei	  Ruto,	  former	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education,	  Science	  and	  Technology,	  Henry	  Kiprono	  Kosgey,	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  and	  Chairman	  of	  ODM,	  Uhuru	  Muigai	  Kenyatta,	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  former	  Minister	  for	  Finance,	  Mohammed	  Hussein	  Ali,	  Chief	  Executive	  of	  the	  Postal	  Corporation	  of	  Kenya,	  and	  Francis	  Kirimi	  Muthaura,	  former	  Head	  of	  the	  Public	  Service	  and	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Cabinet.	  See	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  at	  www.icc-­‐cpi.int.	  122	  Gibson	  and	  Long,	  2008,	  p.	  5;	  exit	  polling	  conducted	  in	  partnership	  between	  the	  Department	  of	  Political	  Science,	  University	  California	  San	  Diego,	  and	  the	  International	  Republican	  Institute.	  The	  exit	  poll	  included	  5495	  surveys	  distributed	  nation-­‐wide	  with	  random	  selection	  of	  polling	  stations	  and	  respondents	  exiting	  polling	  centers.	  	  123	  Ibid,	  p.	  4.	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2.7  Reconciliation, Constitutional Reform, and Opportunities for the Maasai? 
 Under intense international pressure, on February 1, 2008, Mwai Kibaki and 
Raila Odinga signed the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Agreement which 
established a government of national unity, with Mwai Kibaki as president and 
Raila Odinga assuming the newly created post of prime minister. The power-sharing 
agreement paved the way for the National Accord which was signed by Kibaki and 
Odinga on February 28, 2008. The second agreement was meant to serve as a 
framework for a peaceful solution to the political impasse resulting from the 
botched elections of 2007.  Toward this end, the National Accord established both 
the time frame and process for constitutional, legal and institutional reforms.124 
Specifically, it required the national unity government to undertake broad 
constitutional review through an inclusive consultative process involving the 
Kenyan people. Additionally, it stipulated that a draft constitution must be 
approved by the Kenyan people through a national referendum.  
 The constitutional review process provided the opportunity for citizens and 
civil society groups to submit formal recommendations to the constitutional review 
committee in writing.125 Within eight months of being established the committee had 
received 26,451 written memoranda and presentations from members of the public, 
in addition to 1,917 oral presentations prepared for the Committee of Experts (CoE) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  National	  Accord	  and	  Reconciliation	  Bill,	  2008,	  accessed	  on	  October	  1,	  2012	  at	  www.kenyalawreports.or.ke/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Bills/2008/The_National_Accord_and_Reconciliation_Bill_2008.pdf.	  125	  The	  Constitutional	  Review	  Act	  of	  2009	  called	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Committee	  of	  Experts	  (COE)	  consisting	  of	  nine	  members,	  including	  two	  non-­‐Kenyans,	  appointed	  by	  the	  President	  after	  a	  nomination	  process	  by	  the	  National	  Assembly.	  See	  the	  Final	  Report	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Experts	  on	  Constitutional	  Review	  (October	  11,	  2010),	  accessed	  at	  www.coekenya.go.ke.	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from regional hearings and other various consultations. 126   Despite this 
unprecedented level of public participation in the constitutional review process, 
many in the minority and indigenous rights communities expressed concerns about 
the exclusion of minority, indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups on the 
review committee.127 However, the Maasai I spoke with did not share similar 
sentiments about being excluded from the constitutional process. 128 In fact, many 
interlocutors suggested that the framework provided by the constitution offered 
unprecedented opportunities for greater political engagement, local control over 
decision-making, and new avenues to resolve long standing land grievances. Indeed 
most of the Maasai with whom I spoke agreed that the spirit of the new constitution 
is fundamentally different than the previous constitution in that it reinforces the 
principles of equality, inclusion, and fuller participation among Kenya’s diverse 
ethnic communities. However, the optimism expressed by interlocutors was often 
tinged with apprehension. There seemed to be a nagging question as to whether 
Kenya’s political leaders would follow the blueprint provided by the new 
constitution. According to one interlocutor, a former district commissioner and local 
elder, “If the constitution is really going to be practiced as it is written, it will be the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Final	  Report,	  Committee	  of	  Experts,	  2010,	  p.	  41;	  of	  the	  submissions,	  5,212	  were	  received	  from	  organized	  groups,	  88	  from	  political	  parties,	  50	  from	  the	  private	  sector,	  2969	  from	  religious	  organizations,	  and	  32	  from	  statutory	  bodies.	  An	  addition	  1,917	  oral	  presentations	  from	  regional	  hearings	  were	  also	  received	  by	  the	  CoE.	  	  127	  Minority	  Rights	  Commission,	  Consultative	  Meeting	  Report,	  “Anchoring	  Minorities	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples’	  Rights	  in	  Kenya’s	  Constitutional	  Review	  Process,”	  August	  7,	  2009;	  accessed	  at	  www.fishersrights.or.ke.	  	  128	  Also	  see,	  “Kenya’s	  New	  Constitution	  Benefits	  Indigenous	  Peoples,”	  published	  on	  Cultural	  Survival,	  August	  12,	  2010;	  accessed	  at	  www.culturalsurvival.org/news/kenya/kenyas-­‐new-­‐constitution-­‐benefits-­‐indigenous-­‐peoples.	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best thing for Maasai and other minority groups. It will be real change. But, no one 
knows if that will really happen.”129 
 
2.8  Constitutional Referendum and the “Birth of a Second Republic”130 
 On August 4, 2010 the proposed constitution passed referendum with sixty-
seven percent of Kenyans voting in its favor. On August 27, 2010, the government 
officially promulgated the new constitution, ushering in a new era of shared 
governance and equitable distribution of power and resources among Kenya’s 42 
ethnic groups.131  At least in principle, the constitution established a new and 
substantially more democratic system of government.  Under the new presidential 
system, the president is elected directly by the people and does not serve as a 
member of parliament. While the president retains the power to appoint cabinet and 
permanent secretaries, these appointments are subject to approval by the National 
Assembly.  In turn, the National Assembly is composed of a lower and upper house 
rather than a single house as under the previous constitution. In addition, the new 
constitution calls for the creation of an independent supreme court and the sanctity 
of judicial independence, a comprehensive Bill of Rights which entitles all Kenyans 
to certain fundamental rights and freedoms, including access to impartial judicial 
processes, right to privacy, freedom of association and assembly, economic and 
social rights as well as freedom from discrimination based on race, sex, ethnic or 
social origin and religion.132 
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  Interlocutor	  B.	  130	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  Pal	  Ghai	  and	  Jill	  Conttrell	  Ghai,	  Kenya’s	  Constitution:	  An	  Instrument	  of	  Change,	  (Nairobi:	  	  Katiba	  Institute,	  2011),	  p.	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  131	  Ibid.,	  p.iii.	  	  132	  Constitution	  of	  Kenya,	  2010,	  Chapter	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 Perhaps the most significant change associated with the new constitution is 
the principle of power sharing between the national and county government. As 
stated in the constitution, the intent of the devolution of government is “to [give] 
power of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the people 
in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them.” 133 
Most important for minority groups such as the Maasai, the constitution includes 
the following special protections for historically marginalized groups:  
(1) The establishment of affirmative action programs designed to ensure that 
minorities, women, and other marginalized groups are represented in 
governance and other spheres of life; 
(2) The addition of 47 special seats in the National Assembly to be held by 
women elected by voters of each of the 47 counties to represent women’s 
interests; 
(3) The addition of special protections for communally held land, and the 
establishment of a National Land Commission which will be responsible for 
advising the government on the land reform policies and for investigating 
and redressing historic land injustices;  
(4) And, special recognition of “community land” held by communities 
identified on the basis of ethnicity, culture or similar community interest.134 
 
2.9  Opportunities and Challenges for Maasai in the New Dispensation of Power 
 During my time in Kenya, the Maasai I spoke with expressed support for the 
new constitution. Most were optimistic that minority groups would have greater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Constitution	  of	  Kenya,	  2010,	  Chapter	  11,	  Part	  1,	  Article	  174.	  	  134	  Constitution	  of	  Kenya,	  Chapter	  8,	  Section	  97	  (1)	  (a-­‐c),	  and	  Chapter	  5,	  Section	  67	  (2)	  (e).	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opportunities for participation in Kenya’s political system and more ‘rights’ under 
the new constitution. Moreover, other institutions established in the wake of the 
2007 post election violence offer additional opportunities for the Maasai to seek 
resolution to long-standing grievances. Specifically, several activists referred to the 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) established by the National 
Assembly in 2008 as being of particular significance to the Maasai.  One of the 
mandates of the TJRC is to establish a comprehensive historical record of violations 
of human rights committed between December 1963 and February 28, 2008. Most 
significantly for the Maasai, the work of the Commission also includes 
comprehensive investigation of land grievances. 135  Several prominent Maasai  
organizations, including Maa Civil Society Forum and the Kenya Pastoralist 
Development Network, have already provided testimony before the TJRC on their 
claims regarding historic and contemporary injustices.  
Despite these positive changes, one activist told me that the Maasai 
community is also facing new social, political and economic challenges. Of 
particular concern to many Maasai leaders is the manner in which the county 
assemblies and local administrative structures will be established under the new 
constitution, and whether the Maasai will gain or lose seats in the National 
Assembly because of the newly formed constituencies. Another pressing concern for 
many Maasai is the recent expansion of the Nairobi Metropolitan District into 
Kajiado County which has contributed to myriad changes in Maasailand, including 
rapid growth and urbanization in northern Kajiado, land use changes and loss of 
pastoral lands, increased pressure on natural resources, and sudden demographic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  See	  The	  Truth,	  Justice	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  of	  Kenya	  Act,	  2008,	  accessed	  at	  www.tjrckenya.org.	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changes which threaten to undermine Maasai political representation in Kajiado 
County.  
The following chapter examines these changes in greater detail, and explores 
the ways they are affecting the Maasai people of Kajiado County. Also presented in 
chapter 3 is an overview of the national political and social climate during the period 
of fieldwork, with specific reference to the emergence of ethnicity and ethnic 
allegiance as a central issue shaping public discourse in the country. It is within this 
context that the perspectives of Maasai activists and leaders are examined. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THREATS IN MAASAILAND 
 
“All the talk about unity and equality in Kenya is just that, talk.” 136 
“The Maasai won’t allow others to take electoral seats in the Kajiado County. This situation 
is a recipe for chaos.”137  
 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
In this chapter I return to Kajiado—the heart of Maasailand—to examine the 
experiences, perspectives, and strategies of Maasai as they seek to define their place 
in Kenya. It will be argued here that a prevailing sense of insecurity concerning 
demographic, political, and social changes in Kajiado reinforce feelings of 
marginalization and exclusion among the Maasai.  Of particular concern to the 
Maasai are threats to their pastoralist livelihood, and the encroachment of 
settlements in Maasailand. This chapter seeks to examine Maasai perspectives on 
these threats and locate them within the larger social and political environment in 
Kenya as a means to understand Maasai political identity and social mobilization.  
  The chapter opens with a discussion of changes in Kajiado which have taken 
place over the past half decade as a result of national policies, constitutional reforms, 
and demographic changes affecting the Kajiado area. Next the chapter explores 
several major themes that emerged through interviews with Maasai leaders, 
including impressions on pastoralism and the meaning of land, development, 
education, and perceived prejudice against the Maasai.  Finally, the chapter 
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concludes with a discussion of the ways these views reinforce Maasai identity and 
social mobilization. 
 
3.2 Introduction:  The Death of a Kenyan Patriot and a Maasai Brother 
 On the morning of June 10, 2012 as I sat at a table at a popular café in the 
heart of Kajiado town preparing for an interview later that day, news broke that a 
helicopter carrying Minister George Saitoti had crashed in the rolling hills just 
northwest of Kajiado. Within moments of the report of Saitoti’s death, cell phones of 
patrons in the restaurant sprang to life as text messages and calls spread the news of 
the crash. Grown men bowed their heads or shook them in defiance of the reports. 
Children gathered at the entrance of the restaurant to watch the coverage, unable to 
fully comprehend the disappointment and sadness in the eyes of their parents and 
elders.  
 Professor Saitoti had represented the Kajiado North District for more than 
two decades. At the time of his death he served as the senior Minister of Parliament 
from Kajiado. He also held the high level cabinet position of Minister of Internal 
Security. Only weeks before the fatal crash, Professor Saitoti had announced his 
candidacy for president in the 2013 national elections.138  Along with Minister 
William Ole Ntimama—a prominent Maasai leader who holds positions as member 
of parliament for Narok district and Minister of State for National Heritage and 
Culture—Professor Saitoti was one of very few national leaders with ties to the 
community. And, his sudden death brought great uncertainty and unease to the 
Maasai of Kajiado.  
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 In the days following his death, Professor Saitoti was spoken of as a national 
patriarch and a stalwart leader. In Nairobi, banners draped across city streets 
proclaimed Saitoti a “True Kenyan Patriot.” Though valorized as an exemplary 
national leader in the media and among prominent national politicians, the Maasai 
community had a complicated relationship with Minister Saitoti who was of mixed 
ethnicity, born to a Kikuyu father and a Maasai mother. Though some Maasai 
considered Saitoti a “true Maasai brother,”139 a leader who understood the issues 
facing the Maasai community and could represent them in national politics, others 
viewed Saitoti’s multi-ethnic background as problematic. Many Maasai expressed 
concern that his allegiance would always be divided unevenly between two 
constituencies:  the minority Maasai and the dominant Kikuyu.  Still, Saitoti’s rise in 
power and position in Kenya provided opportunities for Maasai to access resources 
and gain new standing in Kenya’s ethnically-aligned, patrimonial political system.  
 As one acquaintance explained, “we carry this thing called ethnicity to our 
professions, to our places of work, to everywhere we go. It keeps on following us.” 
140 This same individual shared the story of how he obtained grants to attend 
university during Saitoti’s tenure as Minister of Education based on ethnic 
patronage, saying: 
I think I was purely awarded [the funding] on the 
basis that I came from Kajiado and I was a Maasai….I 
knew his personal assistant, he comes from Bisel in 
Kajiado District, and we developed a very good 
rapport. I worked closely with him, politically—
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politically in the sense that I mobilized some young 
people to support them.141   
 
This acquaintance explained that after Saitoti left the Ministry of Education he was 
unable to obtain additional education grants because he could no longer draw upon 
ethnic connections.  
 Similar stories of patronage were shared with me in the weeks following 
Saitoti’s death as the Maasai came to terms with the loss of such an important leader 
in their community.142 At Professor Saitoti’s burial in Kitengela town in Northern 
Kajiado, Maasai leaders spoke publically about the need to replace Saitoti with a 
leader drawn from the Maasai community. As former Narok County Council 
Chairman, Shadrack ole Rotinken eulogized Professor Saitoti at his funeral, he urged 
the government to replace the Minister with another Maasai leader saying “All our 
hope was on Saitoti. But the Maasai community has lagged behind in development 
and we need an able leader to replace him.”143    
 In Kenya’s formerly highly centralized presidential system, Professor Saitoti 
provided the minority Maasai critical leverage in national politics. Even for 
individuals within Maasai society that did not receive direct “material gains” 
through Saitoti’s elevated position in government, the nature of clientelism in multi-
ethnic systems such as Kenya is that it reinforces the “less tangible bonds of ethnic 
identity.” 144 As van de Walle finds, for ethnic minorities, “citizens may feel that only 
a member of their own ethnic group may end up defending the interests of the 
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ethnic group as a whole, and that voting for a member of another ethnic group will 
certainly not do so.” 145  As will be explored more deeply in the following sections, 
the need to promote new Maasai leaders in national politics is viewed as even more 
crucial for the community in the current political and economic environment, given 
the uncertainty around national development initiatives taking place in Kajiado 
County and because of the changing nature of ‘local’ politics under the new 
devolved system of government. 
 
3.3  Re-Making Maasailand 
 “It can be called the Great Trek to Kajiado County…in search of land,” 
opened an article published in the Daily Nation in July 2011 referring to the rapid 
urbanization and growth in population in northern Kajiado. The population growth 
is partially due to policy changes which are opening up the former pastoral lands to 
increased development; resulting in increasing land values, rapid land sales and 
demographic changes in northern Kajiado.  
 The first major change in Kajiado occurred with the promulgation of the new 
constitution which called for a devolution of government to the counties. During the 
constitutional review process it was decided that the establishment of county 
boundaries should be based on the original 47 administrative units in existence at 
the time of Kenya’s independence.146 It was believed that the relative geographic size 
and population distribution of the original jurisdictions was more optimal than 
devolving government to the current local government structure composed of 
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nearly 350 sub-national districts. 147  In drawing the new county constituency and 
ward boundaries,  Kenya’s Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission 
(IIBRC) also took into consideration other factors including population density and 
demographic trends, geographical features, physical and human infrastructure, cost 
of administration, historical and cultural ties and the views of communities affected 
by the designation of new constituencies.148   
 From this process, a newly formed Kajiado County emerged as a 
consolidation of the former districts of Kajiado North, Kajiado Central and 
Loitokitok. Together these make up the mainstay of the Maasai population. 
Encompassing over 21,000 km2, Kajiado County extends from the towns of Ngong 
and Kitengela in the north to Namanga and Loitokitok on the Tanzanian border to 
the southeast.  
 In uniting these three districts the Maasai territory originally established as 
part of the Southern Reserve under British colonial rule was reconstituted as a legal 
constituency. While many Maasai reside outside of Kajiado County, including most 
notably within Narok County, Kajiado County is considered to be the contemporary 
homeland of Kenya’s Maasai and is informally called Maasailand because of its vast 
reserves of pastoral lands, large population of Maasai people, and the maintenance  
of traditional communal land arrangements including group ranches. More than 
half of the population of Kajiado County is Maasai, with Kikuyu and Kamba making 
up the other major groups. 149(See Figures 3.1 and 3.2) 
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Figure 3.1 Kenya: Geographic Distribution of Ethnic Groups (Source:  CIA, UK 
Foreign Office)150 
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Figure 3.2 Kenya:  Political Map of County Constituencies, 2012 
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3.4.1 Physiographic and Natural Conditions  
 Despite the large reserves of plains which make pastoralism ideal in this area, 
Kajiado County is prone to devastating droughts which threaten the pastoral way of 
life. The most recent drought, ending in 2007, killed more than 70% of  livestock and 
devastated the livelihoods of many Maasai pastoralists in the area.151  Access to 
fertile grazing lands and water is a constant concern for Maasai pastoralists. The 
largest water source, Lake Magadi located in the southern depression of the Rift 
Valley, contains substantial deposits of soda ash which is commercially exploited.  
Conflicts over access to Lake Magadi continue to affect the Maasai of the 
southwestern region of Kajiado County.  Though there are three major rivers in the 
County (the Athi, Ewaso Nyiro and Pakasae rivers), there are only a few reliable 
tributaries. The County has a bi-modal rainfall pattern consisting of a short rainy 
season between October and December and a long rainy season between March and 
May, though average rainfalls vary considerably by altitude. The heaviest rains fall 
in higher elevations near the Ngong Hills where average rainfall is estimated at 
1250mm. At the lower range, Magadi receives less than 500mm per year.152  
 Climate change threatens to increase the vulnerability of the Maasai 
pastoralists of Kajiado. Recent data indicate that the country has been warming at a 
rate of 0.5°C since the end of the 1970s; approximately 1.5 times the global 
average.153  As rains have become more variable and unpredictable the incidence of 
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drought has also increased.154  While pastoralism prospered in semi-arid regions due 
to highly successful adaptive strategies which include high mobility and communal 
management of pasture and water, increasing land pressure and inadequate 
investment in the development of pastoral areas heighten the vulnerability of the 
Maasai to the changing environmental conditions. 155  In acute phases such as 
drought, environmental uncertainty has immediate and profound economic costs. 
The loss of livestock increases long-term vulnerability for Maasai pastoralists who 
are unable to recover from one drought to the next. At the same time, the loss of 
livestock affects the overall GDP of Kenya. In 2009, the loss of livestock income is 
estimated to have cost the nation’s economy more than 38 billion Kenyan 
Shillings.156 (See Figure 3.3: Kajiado County Map) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  Ibid.	  According	  to	  the	  Centre	  for	  Minority	  Rights	  Development,	  since	  2008,	  Kenya	  has	  experience	  two	  of	  the	  most	  severe	  drought	  in	  its	  recent	  history.	  During	  the	  droughts	  of	  2009	  and	  2011	  more	  than	  2	  million	  and	  8	  million	  livestock	  died	  respectively.	  See	  “Getting	  the	  Right	  Policies	  to	  Strengthen	  Pastoral	  Livelihoods,”	  Centre	  for	  Minority	  Rights	  Development,	  presentation	  on	  December	  8,	  2011.	  155	  “Pastoralism	  and	  Climate	  Change:	  Enabling	  Adaptive	  Capacity,”	  Synthesis	  Paper,	  humanitarian	  Policy	  Group,	  April	  2009;	  accessed	  at	  www.odihpn.org.	  	  156	  “Getting	  the	  Right	  Policies	  to	  Strengthen	  Pastoral	  Livelihoods,”	  Centre	  for	  Minority	  Rights	  Development,	  presentation	  on	  December	  8,	  2011.	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Figure 3.3: Kajiado County157 
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  Source:	  	  Marcel	  Rutten	  and	  Moses	  Mwangi,	  “Mobile	  Cash	  for	  Nomadic	  Livestock	  Keepers:	  The	  Impact	  of	  the	  Mobile	  Phone	  Money	  Innovation	  (M-­‐Pesa)	  on	  Maasai	  Pastoralists	  in	  Kenya,”	  In	  Transforming	  
Innovations	  in	  Africa:	  	  Explorative	  Studies	  on	  Appropriation	  in	  African	  Societies,	  (eds)	  Jan-­‐Bart	  Gewald,	  Andre	  Elivald,	  and	  Iva	  Pesa.	  (2012).	  The	  Netherlands:	  	  IDC	  Publishing.	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3.5 Demographic Changes, Development and Land Use in Kajiado County 
 Kajiado County has traditionally been defined by semi-nomadic pastoralism 
which until recently was practiced on land that was communally owned.158  Group 
ranches, established by the government in the 1960s and 1970s, were initially viewed 
as a solution to the rapid adjudication of land for private tenure in the immediate 
post-independence period. While many Maasai leaders initially accepted the 
formation of group ranches because of fears that rapid land adjudication threatened 
the integrity of the Maasai rangelands, it is widely acknowledged that the Maasai 
did not fully understand the implications of the group ranch approach.159  Even so, 
poor management of the ranches and growing desire among many group ranch 
members to own private title deeds for use as collateral led to the demise of many of 
Kajiado’s 51 group ranches.160  Continued interest in securing private land tenure 
has led to the subdivision of group ranches in the past two decades, and a rise in the 
number of individually owned parcels of land used for pastoralism and increasingly 
for other purposes including agriculture and development.161 The wane in financial 
support from the government in the early 1980s contributed to the interest in private 
land ownership, as infrastructural facilities began to deteriorate and the 
management of communal resources (e.g., water pumps, engines and livestock dips) 
fell on the Maasai leadership within the ranches.162 As urbanization and settlement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  Kajiado	  District	  Development	  Plan,	  2008,	  p.	  22.	  	  159	  J.C.,	  Ng’ethe,	  “Group	  Ranch	  Concept	  and	  Practice	  in	  Kenya	  with	  Special	  Emphasis	  on	  Kajiado	  District,”	  Report	  of	  the	  Food	  and	  Agricultural	  Organization	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  accessed	  at	  www.fao.org/wairdocs/ILRI/x5485E/x5485e0t.htm.	  160	  Ibid,	  pp.	  12-­‐13.	  	  161	  According	  to	  the	  organization,	  Dupoto	  E-­‐maa	  Olkejuado	  Pastoralists	  Development	  Organization	  only	  12	  of	  the	  original	  52	  groups	  ranches	  are	  still	  in	  existence	  today.	  	  162	  The	  Kenya	  Livestock	  Development	  Policy	  (1980)	  provided	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  communal	  ranches	  for	  pastoralists.	  Three	  externally	  funded	  projects	  financed	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Kenya	  ensured	  initial	  financing	  for	  the	  demarcation	  of	  ranches,	  and	  the	  infrastructural	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in Northern Kajiado spreads southward along the A104, the main throughway 
connecting Nairobi to Tanzania, protection of pastoral lands has become one of the 
most important issues facing Maasai.    
 
3.5.1 Is Kajiado Still Maasailand? The Expansion of the Nairobi Metropolitan District 
 In recent years, national policies which seek to open up pastoral lands for 
national development have affected the demographic makeup and priorities for land 
use in Kajiado. The most significant influence is the expansion of the Nairobi 
metropolitan area into Kajiado County as part of Vision 2030, Kenya’s grand 
blueprint for economic development and sustainable urbanization. (See Figure 3.4) 
Vision 2030 seeks to transform Nairobi into a world class African metropolis 
through the infusion of development funds for city infrastructure and the planned 
growth of new environs to address high urban migration and poor living conditions 
in the urban slums of Nairobi.163 Under the guidelines of this policy a new Ministry 
of Nairobi Metropolitan Development was established to design and administer the 
expanded Nairobi Metropolitan Region. With financial and technical assistance from 
the World Bank,164 the Ministry seeks to “build a robust, internationally competitive, 
dynamic inclusive economy” through the creation of a “world class infrastructure 
and enhanced linkages and accessibility to national, regional and global markets.” 165 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  development	  within	  the	  ranches	  for	  a	  limited	  period	  of	  time.	  See	  J.C.,	  Ng’ethe,	  “Group	  Ranch	  Concept	  and	  Practice	  in	  Kenya	  with	  Special	  Emphasis	  on	  Kajiado	  District,”	  Report	  of	  the	  Food	  and	  Agricultural	  Organization	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  accessed	  at	  www.fao.org/wairdocs/ILRI/x5485E/x5485e0t.htm.	  	  163	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Ministry	  of	  Nairobi	  Metropolitan	  Development	  Resettlement	  Policy	  Framework,	  2011.	  	  164	  The	  Nairobi	  Metropolitan	  Services	  Implementation	  Project	  is	  an	  integral	  element	  of	  the	  Country	  Partnership	  Strategy	  (CPS)	  between	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Kenya.	  	  165	  Ibid.,	  p.	  1.	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Figure 3.4 Planned Nairobi Metropolitan Region, 2012166 
 
 With the introduction of the Nairobi Metropolitan Area Bill in 2009 the 
Nairobi metropolitan region was expanded to include the counties of Nairobi, 
Kiambu, Machakos and Kajiado; an area spanning 32,000 km2 with a population of 
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  See	  Ministry	  of	  Nairobi	  Metropolitan	  Development	  at	  www.nairobimetro.go.ke	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more than 6.65 million people. 167  Under the above legislation, the Minister of the 
Metropolitan District is granted unprecedented authority to acquire land, and 
establish, terminate, rename, merge or annex a municipality, county or township.168 
As outlined by Vision 2030, the development of the NMR is intimately tied to 
Kenya’s long-term economic health.  To meet the goals laid forth in Vision 2030, 
including sustained average economic growth of 10% per year over the next two 
decades, the economy of the NMR must grow by 15% a year on average. 169 
Increasingly, agriculture is expected to be the main occupation in the rural areas of 
the NMR, with manufacturing, transportation, construction and service sectors also 
contributing to the overall economy of the region. Vision 2030 calls for the 
promotion of these sectors given their significant contribution to Kenya’s GDP.  In 
2009 alone, the NMR’s service sector contributed 68% of the GDP, and agriculture 
contributed another 10%.170  In 2011, the Ministry of the Nairobi Metropolitan 
Region released the projected occupational and land use priorities for the major 
urban centers in the NMR. These projections underscore a rapid occupational shift 
away from pastoralism in Kajiado County. (See Appendix B for Proposed 
Occupational Structure and Land Use by 203 in Kitengela, Isinya and Kajiado 
towns.) 
 While planning documents acknowledged that the expansion of the 
metropolitan region will impact on people’s livelihoods “and ha[s] direct bearing on 
land requirements and result in displacements,” the risk to pastoralism was not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Census	  data	  based	  on	  2009	  data;	  Information	  obtained	  from	  www.nairobimetro.go.ke.	  	  168	  Saitabao	  ole,	  “Nairobi	  Bill	  at	  Best	  Presmature,”	  Daily	  Nation,	  March	  10,	  2009,	  p.	  11.	  	  169	  “Development	  of	  a	  Spatial	  Planning	  Concept	  for	  Nairobi	  Metropolitan	  Region,	  Study	  Status	  Executive	  Summary,	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Ministry	  of	  Nairobi	  Metropolitan	  Development,	  February	  2011.	  	  170	  Ibid,	  p.	  iv.	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explicitly cited as a concern of the Ministry. 171  In 2009 the County Council of 
Olkejuado rejected the proposal, arguing that its enactment undermined efforts to 
decentralize decision-making authority by transferring power from the Town and 
County Councils to the Minister of the Nairobi Metropolitan District.  Despite 
concerns within Maasai civil society and from local leaders such as Kajiado Council 
chairman Tarayia ole Kores, several national leaders within the Maasai community 
including Minister George Saitoti (Kajiado North) and Minister Joseph Nkaissery 
(Kajiado Central) stayed relatively silent on the issue of expansion. For some leaders 
within the Maasai community it was difficult to oppose the expansion of the Nairobi 
metropolitan area given the plan’s importance to national development.  This was 
also true for some in civil society who did not wish to be viewed as “anti-
development.”   
 Yet, at the same time that activists and political leaders carefully balanced 
their public statements on the necessity of development in Kajiado County, many 
privately acknowledged their suspicions that national policies seeking to open 
pastoral lands in Kajiado are actually part of a strategic, “broader conspiracy” 
against the Maasai people. 172  At times these concerns were not hidden from public 
view, as when the town council of Kajiado established a taskforce to examine the 
impact of the plan, concluding publically that the expansion of Nairobi is part of a 
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  Among	  the	  vulnerable	  groups	  identified	  by	  the	  Ministry	  were	  the	  poor,	  elderly,	  disabled,	  HIV/AIDS;	  information	  obtained	  from	  the	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Ministry	  of	  Nairobi	  Metropolitan	  Development	  Resettlement	  Policy	  Framework,	  2011.	  172	  Quote	  taken	  from	  conversations	  with	  interlocutor	  E,	  however	  similar	  sentiments	  were	  expressed	  by	  interlocutors	  C,	  D,	  and	  F.	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“process started more than 100 years ago to dispossess the Maasai of their land and 
push the community into extinction.”173  
 While such statements may appear hyperbolic, they are at times supported by 
statements and actions of national leaders from other communities who cast the 
Maasai as undeveloped and expendable.  In one such high profile statement 
pertaining to the great land buy-out in Kajiado, Kalum Kashuru told the Daily 
Nation that: 
It is not going to end in the near future, not even in 
the next century because the Maasai have not known 
anything else beyond a cow…God blessed the Maasai 
with vast lands and also a slow growing population 
with no threat of explosion; they will sell land near 
Nairobi and shift further into the interior to continue 
their way of life with livestock.174   
 
 The Maasai take particular exception to such logic, arguing instead that they 
have been overly accommodating in their willingness to move for other 
communities or projects such as the establishment of national parks and industrial 
development. But there is a growing sense of urgency within the community that if 
they do not take a stand against encroachment now, their way of life will end, and as 
one acquaintance said, “there will no longer be this people called Maasai.”175 
 Despite concerns from the Maasai community, the Ministry of Nairobi 
Metropolitan Development began implementing their plans in 2009 after receiving 2 
billion Kenyan shillings through its cooperative agreement with the World Bank for 
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  Peterson	  Githaiga,	  “Daggers	  drawn	  over	  plan	  to	  make	  Nairobi	  a	  metropolis,”	  Daily	  Nation,	  February	  26,	  2009.	  	  174	  Emman	  Omari,	  “Nairobi	  moves	  south:	  	  Is	  pastoralism	  threatened?”	  Daily	  Nation,	  July	  7,	  2011.	  	  175	  Interlocutor	  C.	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the general administration and planning of the new metropolitan region.176  One of 
the initial developments was improvement of the A104 from Nairobi to Namanga; 
this thoroughfare is now one of the best highways in Kenya, greatly increasing the 
speed of traffic through Kajiado County and easing the way for development deeper 
into Maasailand.  
 
3.5.2 Population Growth and Urbanization in Northern Kajiado 
 The expansion of the Nairobi metropolitan area into Kajiado is transforming 
the northern region of the county in many ways. With investments in new 
infrastructure projects, including roads, sanitation and water, northern Kajiado has 
seen a growth of industry including concrete production and agribusiness. In 
particular there is rapid growth in the floral industry with hundreds of new 
greenhouses appearing each year along the A104 and along Athi river. 177  
 The changes taking place in northern Kajiado, coupled with its proximity to 
Nairobi, are contributing to explosive growth and urbanization in the northern 
towns of Kitengela, Ngong and Ngata Rongai.178  Official estimates place Kajiado’s 
annual population growth at 4.51% per year, significantly above the national growth 
rate of 2.9%. It should be noted that this data does not reflect changes in the past few 
years. 179   Recent data indicates that Ngong town has experienced the highest 
population growth, and is now the most populated town in Kajiado County with a 
population of 107,188. The northern town of Kitengela is the second most populated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  Peterson	  Githaiga,	  “Daggers	  drawn	  over	  plan	  to	  make	  Nairobi	  a	  metropolis,”	  Daily	  Nation,	  February	  26,	  2009.	  177	  CSO’s	  County	  Consultative	  Forum	  on	  the	  NCCRS	  Action	  Plan,	  Ministry	  of	  Environment	  and	  Mineral	  Resources,	  National	  Climate	  Change	  Response	  Strategy	  Action	  Plan,	  March	  30,	  2012.,	  p.	  13.	  178	  Institute	  for	  Social	  Accounting,	  www.tisa.or.ke,	  based	  on	  2009	  census.	  	  179	  Kajiado	  District	  Development	  Plan,	  2008.	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town, with a population of 58,167.  By comparison, Kajiado town, which has also 
seen rapid growth in recent years, has a population of only 14,000. 180  In its most 
recent planning report, the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development 
concluded that many of the urban centers are (or will be) experiencing “runaway 
growth rates.”  The overall forecast for population in the metropolitan region is 
presented in Table 3.1. 
   
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1:  Nairobi Metropolitan Region 2030 Population Forecast181 
 
Based on current planning, it is also reasonable to assume that there will be 
considerable changes in land use in the NMR over the next two decades due to 
increasing urbanization and concomitant changes in the demographic and economic 
outlook of the area. Current plans for the expansion of the NMR suggest that the 
demand for land will increase in the next two decades, putting pressure on the 
remaining pastoral lands in Kajiado and Narok Counties. Estimates show that 
Kitengela and Ongata Rongai in northern Kajiado County will reserve only between 
15% and 18% of available land as “open space” by 2030, with the remaining land 
allocated for urban development. Kajiado town and surrounding areas are expected 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  180	  Institute	  for	  Social	  Accountability,	  Kajiado	  County,	  accessed	  at	  http://kenya.usaid.gov.	  	  181	  “Development	  of	  a	  Spatial	  Planning	  Concept	  for	  Nairobi	  Metropolitan	  Region,”	  Study	  Status,	  February	  2011,	  Republic	  of	  Kenya,	  Ministry	  of	  Nairobi	  Metropolitan	  Development,	  accessed	  at	  www.nairobimetro.go.ke.	  	  
Spatial	  Unit	  	   2009	   2030	  Ngong	   107,188	   412,641	  Kitengela	   	  	  58,167	   223,925	  Ongata	  Rongai	   	  	  40,178	   	  	  69,664	  Kiserian	   	  	  	  9,066	   	  	  34,901	  Isinya	   	  	  	  8,670	   	  	  33,377	  Kajiado	   	  18,281	   	  70,376	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to limit “open space” to 17% of the total land area by 2030, with 10% designated as 
“public and semi-public land” and another 45% designated as residential area.182   
 The issue of population growth and urbanization was the most serious 
concern for activists within Maasai civil society, including nongovernmental 
organizations working with Maasai pastoralists to preserve their way of life. 
Migration into the northern suburbs is increasing pressure on water and sanitation 
and other social amenities provided by the county.183 There are also growing 
concerns about the growth of urban slums, increased street families and insecurity 
in northern Kajiado.184  The towns of Athi River and Kitengela have experienced 
considerable population growth in the past five to ten years. Satellite images of 
northern Kajiado taken in 2003 and 2011 reveal the expansion of large scale 
residential settlements as well as the growth of industrial areas along the A104 
corridor and Mombasa Highway. (See Appendix A, GoogleImages 1-2 and 4-5.) 
Pastoral groups expressed serious reservation about the environmental 
sustainability of such rapid development, noting that the major water sources 
around Athi River in northern Kajiado are affected by industrial run off and 
increased demand by the cement and agricultural industries, and high rate of 
settlement in the northern part of the County. Satellite images taken in 2012 exhibit 
large scale agricultural greenhouses situated along the Athi River east of the Athi-
Kitengela area in Northern Kajiado. (See Appendix A, GoogleImage 3.) 
 The expansion of settlement and agribusiness along the A104 from Nairobi 
south to Kajiado town is contributing to an increase in land prices, especially near 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  Ibid,	  p.	  8.	  183	  Ibid.	  	  184	  Kajiado	  District	  Development	  Plan,	  2008,	  p.	  45.	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and south of Kitengela where open lands are attracting investors interested in 
developing the land for residential settlements and agriculture. 185  (See Google 
Images 6-8 to view development along the A104 north of and in the proximity of 
Isinya in Northern Kajiado.) Activists and organizations working with Maasai 
pastoralists indicate that increasing land prices in Kajiado County are causing ripple 
effects throughout the community. First, there has been rapid selling off of pastoral 
lands in the northern regions of the County. And, there is growing concern that 
illiterate Maasai are being subjected to predatory land sales which unfairly 
compensate sellers. With the high demand for land in northern Kajiado this area has 
also seen a rise in illegal land sales, including an increase in fraudulent transactions 
such as falsification of land deeds.  
Image 3.1 Photo of Real Estate Billboard along the A104, Kajiado County, 2012 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	  Kajiado	  District	  Development	  Plan,	  2008,	  p.	  16.	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Image 3.2 Kajiado County, along the A104, 2012.186 
  
 Many organizations are working to educate the Maasai about the risk of 
selling their lands for short-term profit and the long-term costs of the loss of grazing 
pastures.  Lack of education and understanding of legal and financial systems 
increase the risk for Maasai. In particular, there is concern that there will be a rise in 
poverty and homelessness among Maasai who are selling their lands but not 
securely investing the revenue. A representative of a pastoral organization working 
to educate Maasai about land deals explained, “the majority of the Maasai who are 
selling land are not getting good deals. They are selling land little by little but failing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  Residents	  are	  increasingly	  identifying	  their	  properties	  with	  signs	  that	  there	  land	  is	  not	  for	  sale.	  This	  is	  a	  common	  occurrence	  in	  Kajiado	  County	  given	  the	  rise	  in	  in-­‐migration	  and	  rapid	  increase	  in	  land	  sales.	  The	  increase	  of	  fraudulent	  land	  schemes	  were	  cited	  as	  reasons	  for	  such	  signs.	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to invest the money. In the end, many Maasai end up poorer because they spend the 
money and are left with no land to practice pastoralism.”187  
 Some Maasai I spoke with suggested that the buy-out of pastoral lands is part 
of a strategic plan to “dilute the Kajiado area with non-Maasai.”188 The head of a 
nongovernmental organization working to promote women in leadership within the 
Maasai community expressed concern that changing demographics in northern 
Kajiado would make it less likely that the Maasai could secure a parliamentary seat 
in the next election, noting “that means Kajiado will slowly become less and less 
Maasai politically.”189  This is a concern that was echoed by many interlocutors and 
in  casual conversations with the Maasai in Kajiado. Many activists believe that 
political tension will lead to increased conflict in Kajiado, particularly during 
elections. One interlocutor noted that the situation in northern Kajiado is “very 
likely to be a repeat of the Trans Mara incident between Kisii and Maasai…the 
Maasai will not allow others to take electoral seats in Kajiado County. This is a 
recipe for chaos.” 190   
 The changing demographics and population growth has other economic 
consequences for the Maasai, including increased competition for day labor work in 
Kajiado because of the influx of migrants from other areas of the country. The cycle 
of drought and increased pressure to sell land has pushed many Maasai, especially 
women, into manual labor. Until recently this was a reliable source of extra income 
for many Maasai families. However, several interlocutors indicated that it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  Interlocutor	  D.	  188	  Interlocutor	  D.	  	  189	  Ibid.	  	  190	  Interlocutor	  D;	  The	  reference	  to	  the	  Trans	  Mara	  incidents	  relates	  to	  the	  ethnic	  clashes	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  between	  the	  Maasai	  and	  non-­‐Maasai	  in	  the	  Trans	  Mara	  region	  of	  Kenya.	  See	  the	  Report	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Commission	  appointed	  to	  inquire	  into	  tribal	  clashes	  in	  Kenya,	  Daily	  Nation	  Special	  Report	  found	  at	  www.hrw.org.	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increasingly difficult for Maasai to find employment outside of pastoralism because 
“other tribes” are bringing laborers from their own communities into Kajiado for 
construction and other manual labor jobs. 191  Recent development in Kajiado town is 
also attracting migrants from other areas of the country. New residential settlements 
on the western edge of the town have rapidly expanded since 2008. (See Appendix 
A, GoogleImage 9 for image of Kajiado town, 2011.) According to my interlocutors, 
while there was hope that the expansion of the Nairobi metropolitan area might 
create jobs for Maasai, these jobs are not being realized and there has been no 
concerted effort by the government to train Maasai for employment outside of 
pastoralism.  
 Given the changes in Kajiado many Maasai are concerned about the future of 
pastoralism and the ability of Maasai to compete economically and politically. How 
to best balance development and the needs of the Maasai community is increasingly 
part of the public discourse in Kajiado. Many younger Maasai in particular 
expressed concern about their future as pastoralists and how they will compete for 
jobs with the influx of new populations if pastoralism becomes less viable in 
Kajiado. As one activist concluded:  
Much of the land being sold and redeveloped is being 
turned into agricultural land per the Charles Eliot 
principle 192  which sought to convert Kenyans to 
farmers….this has been the bane of the Maasai 
experience with development. It is what other people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  191	  Sentiments	  expressed	  by	  Interlocutors	  D,	  E	  and	  F	  in	  particular.	  However,	  	  192	  Reference	  to	  Sir	  Charles	  Eliot,	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  appointed	  to	  rule	  the	  East	  African	  Protectorate	  for	  the	  British	  Government	  during	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  and	  early	  20th	  century.	  Eliot	  famously	  said	  of	  the	  Maasai,	  “I	  quite	  recognize	  that	  the	  stupidity	  of	  the	  Masai	  (sic)	  or	  the	  brutality	  of	  Europeans	  may	  render	  it	  [intermingling]	  impossible	  and	  therefore	  we	  must	  have	  a	  reserve	  ready	  if	  needed.”	  (Hughes,	  2006,	  p.	  28)	  It	  was	  under	  Eliot	  that	  the	  Maasai	  were	  forcibly	  moved	  from	  the	  areas	  surrounding	  Nairobi	  to	  the	  Southern	  Reserve	  in	  the	  Rift	  Valley,	  the	  region	  that	  is	  today	  known	  as	  Kajiado	  County.	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imposed on us and if it is not fixed there will be 
conflict.193 
 
 The changing demographic makeup of Kajiado threatens to further 
marginalize the Maasai in another important way. Under the newly devolved 
government, counties receive revenue allocations from the central government 
based on a formula which considers, among other indicators, population density, 
geographic size of the county, and overall poverty in the district. Many Maasai I 
spoke to told me they were stunned to learn that Kajiado County was ranked as the 
wealthiest county in the country, with an overall poverty rate of only 11.6%. The 
Commission on Revenue Allocation which released a study supporting its rankings 
acknowledged that it did not account for inequality within counties, specifically the 
dramatic disparities in wealth between the new urban areas in northern Kajiado and 
the rural pastoral areas in the County. Leaders in the Maasai community were quick 
to point out that “Kajiado’s riches are concentrated on areas in proximity to 
Nairobi,” principally the rapidly growing environs of Ngong, Ongata Rongai and 
Kitengela.  Some commissioners also noted that the rankings were problematic 
because “the interior is as poor as any other marginalized area of the country.”194  
Indeed, prior estimates of poverty in the former districts of Kajiado north and 
Kajiado central exceeded 50% in many locations.195  Maasai in the community 
expressed great reservation about how they will fare under the new County 
government system unless they are able to mobilize the community and elect 
Maasai leaders to represent their interest in national and local governments.  
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  Interlocutor	  E.	  	  194	  Emman	  Omari,	  “Kajiado	  named	  richest	  county,”	  Sunday	  Nation,	  December	  18,	  2011.	  	  195	  Kajiado	  District	  Development	  Plan,	  2008,	  p.	  46.	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 History plays an important role in the way Maasai view their current 
situation in Kajiado.  The influx of migrants from other areas of the country, 
changing demographics of Kajiado and the loss of pastoral lands serve as constant 
visual reminders of their changing world. But, for their the most recent changes in 
Maasailand are simply another part of their long history of marginalization and 
exclusion that began with the Maasai’s experiences under colonial rule and in the 
early years of Kenya’s independence. Though as many interlocutors suggested, 
recent events are catalyzing the community around a shared sense of urgency.  
 
3.6 The Centrality of Land in Maasai Pastoral Culture  
I think land is an important issue when you talk about the 
Maasai because it forms the basis of our existence. We keep 
cows and livestock. So without land, our existence…our 
survival will be hard. And, we have seen other communities 
encroaching on Maasai lands. We’ve seen people who have 
taken the government in Kenya getting a lot of special interests. 
I think the government has strategically discussed the taking of 
Maasai land. This is what we are thinking as the Maasai 
people.196 
 
 Many Maasai view the recent expansion of the Nairobi metropolitan area and 
rapid development of northern Kajiado not as isolated incidents but as part of a long 
history of marginalization whereby the Maasai have been pushed further to the 
margins of society. This history is rooted in the original land loss in the Laikipia area 
north of Nairobi at the hands of the British colonial government in 1904 and 1911. As 
noted in chapter 2, the failure of government leaders to rectify this land loss and 
compensate the Maasai continues to fuel animosity within the community. Though 
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  Interlocutor	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many Maasai in Kajiado are not actively involved in the current fight to restore 
lands in Laikipia, there is a strong sense of allegiance with the Laikipia clans. As an 
acquaintance reflected, “the Laikipia Maasai are on the edge. A very sad thing is 
happening. What should have happened, if we had an honest government regime, is 
that this land should have been returned. This is the Laikipia clans’ land. It belongs 
to them. We Maasai don’t have a problem with our sub-tribes. They should have 
those lands.”197  
 Kajiado also has its own history of land loss. After independence, vast areas 
of Kajiado north and central districts were given to hundreds of government 
officials and their relatives, most of whom were not local residents but migrated 
from other areas of the country. During the early years following independence, the 
Maasai lost approximately 1/3 of their traditional grazing lands in the districts of 
Kajiado and Narok.198  
 It is notable that within the current environment there is growing distrust of 
the government and financial institutions that deal with land. Most Maasai I spoke 
with suggested that historic biases against pastoralism were at the root of policies 
which disregarded their people’s right to land. As an interlocutor said, since colonial 
rule, successive regimes have ruled Kenya but the situation has not changed for 
Maasai; “the colonist envisioned an agricultural Kenya, and thought pastoralism 
was a waste of valuable land. This is still the perception today, whereby open 
pastoral lands are viewed as laying idle.”199  Many Maasai also believe that there are 
systemic barriers in place which discriminate against Maasai by restricting access to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  Interlocutor	  C.	  	  198	  United	  Nations	  Report	  of	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  situation	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms	  of	  indigenous	  people,	  p.	  14.	  	  199	  Interlocutor	  E.	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financial institutions which could serve to advance their pastoral livelihoods or 
enable Maasai to open businesses or make other investments in their future. I was 
told several times that major banks working in Kajiado refuse to give loans to 
Maasai so they are unable to purchase pastoral lands otherwise being bought for 
development.200 Part of the problem for many Maasai is that historically livestock 
has not been viewed as viable collateral for guaranteeing loans, even though the 
practice of using agricultural crops as collateral is widely accepted. In addition, 
many Maasai are unable to access credit because they hold land as part of a 
collective (i.e., group ranch) rather than the possession of individual land tenure. 
While these systematic biases affect all pastoral communities, the Maasai in 
particular believe that they have been targeted because of their unique cultural 
understanding of the meaning of land and learned adaptation to encroachment.  
  For Maasai, land is deeply rooted in cultural preservation of their pastoral 
roots. In particular, the Maasai I spoke with noted that a Maasai must keep cattle 
and have access to open land to be a true Maasai. Even professional Maasai living in 
urban centers maintain homesteads in Kajiado or surrounding areas. As I was told, 
this is part of the Maasai’s ongoing need to “retrace history…and reinforce [their] 
culture and ethnic identity.”201  As one activist said of the threat imposed by land 
loss: 
It would be the end of the Maasai people. On the 
basis of our culture, on the basis of our occupation as 
pastoralists, on the basis of our future because we will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	  Two	  such	  banks	  mentioned	  by	  name	  were	  Equity	  Bank	  and	  Family	  Bank.	  	  Equity	  Bank	  is	  prominent	  throughout	  Kajiado	  County,	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  northern	  areas	  of	  the	  County	  and	  Kajiado	  town.	  However,	  while	  this	  researcher	  did	  not	  find	  documentation	  to	  support	  discrimination,	  similar	  stories	  of	  discriminatory	  banking	  practices	  were	  relayed	  to	  me	  by	  numerous	  interlocutors	  and	  acquaintances.	  	  201	  Interlocutor	  E.	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not have anywhere for our kids…no land for the 
future to inherit.202 
 
 Pastoralism is the center of important cultural activities, including age-set 
ceremonies and bride wealth payments, which maintain an important place in 
contemporary Maasai society. While many Maasai noted that certain cultural 
practices, including female circumcision, polygyny and early marriage are becoming 
less acceptable, pastoralism remains integral to the cultural roots of the Maasai 
people and there is a strong sense that it must be maintained.  
 Some Maasai I spoke with suggested that traditional beliefs about land and 
the avoidance of conflict among the Maasai are partly to blame for their history. As 
one elder put it, “old Maasai tradition was to give space to make peace. So the 
Maasai move deeper into Kajiado to create space for new communities.” 203  But, 
increasing land pressure is making it more difficult to find open space.  Numerous 
interlocutors made reference to the fact that the Maasai have been “too 
accommodating” by allowing other communities to move them onto new lands, 
only to continue encroaching on what remains of their open pasture.  “To avoid 
conflict, we simply move to open space,” another interlocutor suggested. “But, now 
we are restricted by new borders and less and less land in Kajiado.”204  
   
3.7 Opportunity, Prejudice and Being Maasai in Kenya 
As demonstrated here, one of the most common perceptions expressed by 
Maasai I spoke with is the belief that they are prejudiced against and strategically 
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marginalized in Kenya. Lack of opportunity based on ethnicity was cited time and 
again by interlocutors and acquaintances as being at the root of the Maasai problem. 
Though there were differing views on the nature of the prejudice—some arguing it 
was negative stereotypes of pastoralists, others suggesting it was principally 
misperceptions about the Maasai—universally, there was a feeling that the Maasai 
do not have equal opportunity in Kenya.  
Lack of opportunity, even among highly educated Maasai, reinforces strong 
feelings of isolation and exclusion. Many Maasai share a strongly held belief that 
exclusion based on ethnic stereotyping of Maasai as ‘backward’ and ‘uneducated’ 
restricts their individual opportunity.  Others acknowledge that even when Maasai 
are highly educated they face discrimination and exclusion. An acquaintance who 
received a university degree in nursing reiterated a story of how he was placed in a 
clinic in central Kenya during the final stages of his nursing training only to find that 
his supervisors refused to speak the common national language, Kiswahili. Instead, 
his supervisors and fellow students communicated almost entirely in their mother 
tongue, Kikamba—a language he did not know. Even after expressing his frustration 
and making requests to use the common national language, his supervisors refused 
to accommodate him.205 Ultimately, he was transferred to a local clinic in the Kajiado 
area where he finished his training. He largely blamed his experience on the fact that 
decisions related to placement of nursing students in training centers is made 
centrally in Nairobi, and “often by Kikuyu” who discriminate against the Maasai. I 
heard similar stories from other interlocutors that suggest language is often used to 
exclude individuals who are not from the same ethnic group. Some even suggest 
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that it is a growing trend in major urban centers to use the mother tongue rather 
than the national languages of English or Kiswahili.206 As a consequence Maasai 
medical professionals continue to be relegated to the most impoverished areas of the 
country, often returned to the rural areas of Kajiado, where salaries are considerably 
lower and opportunities for advancement are severely restricted. The interlocutor 
concluded, “sometimes it feels like we are still being colonized in our own 
country.”207  
When questioned about the nature of prejudice against the Maasai, many 
individuals with whom I spoke indicated that it is because there is a prevailing sense 
that their pastoral livelihoods and customs are “backwards.”  Many also expressed 
concern that the Maasai have been historically misunderstood by the larger ethnic 
communities who were able to harness power in postcolonial Kenya. Nearly every 
Maasai I spoke with relayed similar stories of discrimination in daily life. For some 
the discrimination came in the form of being denied opportunities for employment 
or education. For others prejudice was experienced as negative stereotyping, as 
when one interlocutor relayed a story of riding on a matatu where several Kikuyu 
were speaking in their native tongue about the fact that the Maasai are “uneducated, 
stupid and useless people.” 208  This prejudice is felt even by younger, professional 
Maasai who have largely abandoned the traditional aesthetic identifiers of ‘being 
Maasai,’ such as expanded earlobes, wearing of a shuka (traditional red cloth draped 
as clothing) and shaved heads for women. When asked what cultural signifiers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  206	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Kenya’s	  national	  languages	  are	  English	  and	  Kiswahili.	  The	  official	  language	  of	  business	  and	  the	  proceedings	  of	  the	  state	  is	  English,	  and	  both	  languages	  are	  taught	  exclusively	  in	  secondary	  school	  and	  university.	  It	  is	  common	  for	  professionals	  to	  be	  fluent	  in	  both	  national	  languages	  and	  their	  mother	  tongue.	  	  207	  Interlocutor	  A.	  	  208	  Interlocutor	  A.	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define the Maasai today, most Maasai I spoke with acknowledged that being Maasai 
is based on several important characteristics. Principal among these is the continued 
practice of pastoralism and maintenance of strong bonds with age-mates and 
extended kin. While many young Maasai indicated that they are adapting to more 
contemporary cultural practices such as monogamous marriages and the pursuit of 
higher education, there is a strong sense that they are losing the remaining cultural 
identifiers that define the Maasai society without the benefit of being accepted as full 
citizens with equal opportunity.  
 
3.8 Ethnic bonds and Maasai Political Identity  
 One of the consequences of this marginalization is a strong desire among the 
Maasai to reassert their cultural heritage, and ‘Maasainess’.  Numerous interlocutors 
expressed to me that the Maasai, more than any other group in Kenya, have worked 
to maintain their cultural heritage.  For instance, one interlocutor suggested that 
only recently have the larger ethnic groups sought to celebrate their cultures 
through cultural theme nights in Nairobi, or other public events—a fact he 
attributed to their need to correct for the ills of society brought with development 
and the “abandonment of their cultural roots.”209  The cultural bonds established 
within Maasai society emerge in interesting ways in discussions about the political 
and economic situation in Maasai communities. Most notably, expressions of 
“pride” about being Maasai are routinely interlaced with declaratives about 
“protecting their culture,” or “ensuring the survival of the Maasai people.” These 
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sentiments were shared—nearly universally—among the Maasai with whom I 
spoke.  
 These findings suggest the shared experience of marginalization and 
economic and political vulnerability seems to reinforce cohesiveness within the 
Maasai community.  Most notably, it seems that prevailing notions of exclusion 
contribute to the production of powerful shared beliefs among Maasai whereby they 
view themselves as under threat by other ethnic communities. As a consequence of 
these shared experiences, bonds within the Maasai community, particularly among 
youth and women, are seemingly strengthened. Most interestingly, it seems that the 
long-term systematic prejudice against Maasai actually reinforces traditional 
cultural institutions that place value on maintaining strong age-set bonds and 
allegiance to extended family. In essence, shared feelings of exclusion and 
marginalization appear to strengthen Maasai ‘groupness’.  
 In talking with youth groups (composed of male youth between the ages of 
16 and 30) I found that allegiance to their age-mates, and the Maasai community in 
general, is strengthened by their shared sense of economic vulnerability, especially 
for those individuals with little education and few job prospects in Kajiado. As a key 
example, in a small village approximately 15 kilometers south of Kajiado town, one 
group of young men, locally referred to as “the brokers,” congregate every evening 
at the mouth of the main road to their village located directly off of the A104. Often 
they are waiting until passing lorries stop in search of laborers, at which point 10 to 
15 young men climb onto the back of the lorry and are whisked off into the night. At 
other times—as witnessed on more than one occasion during the course of field 
work—the brokers stop passing vehicles trying to enter Kajiado town to sell charcoal 
or other goods in order to extort “fees” from merchants perceived to be “outsiders”. 
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I was made to understand that these individuals were “protecting” the local market 
for their Maasai brethren who also sell goods in Kajiado.  The youth also secure the 
village from “outsiders” who are believed to come from Nairobi into the rural areas 
of Kajiado to steal from the Maasai or try to “scam” the Maasai out of money, at 
times by pretending to be officials of a government Ministry.210  
 
3.8.1 Solidarity and the Emergence of a Maasai Political Identity 
This research suggests that the current economic, political and social 
environment in Kenya may be serving to reinforce traditional Maasai systems of 
allegiance, whereby unity and cohesiveness in the community is the best hope for 
individual success. Indeed, the notion of ‘brotherhood’ is already deeply engrained 
in Maasai society as part of the kinship bond between age-mates. The solidarity 
shared by Maasai is then enacted through the production of a particular political 
identity which places importance on the advancement of the Maasai ethnic group.  
In essence, shared perception of exclusion permits sufficient social solidarity to turn 
individual Maasai into an active ethnic group. In turn, social solidarity may be more 
readily channeled into political participation because of the opportunities created by 
the historic and contemporary political and economic realities for Maasai, and most 
importantly, the shared sense of vulnerability based on their assignment in the 
Maasai ethnic category. 211  As Brubaker, 2002, might suggest the transfer of identity 
from individual, or other category (e.g., religious, class etc.) to ethnic category 
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  Several such instances were relayed to me during the course of the research including one 
situation in which individuals attempted to extort money from the local medical clinic by claiming to 
be in the employment of the National Health Service.  As they were run off by the brokers, residents 
of the village told me that they feel safer with the brokers protecting their community.  	  211	  Drawing	  on	  Kasfir	  (1979),	  see	  introductory	  chapter.	  	  
	   	   88	  
reflects a shared perspective on the world. In this case, there is a strong sense of 
threat against the Maasai ethnic group which greatly restricts individual 
opportunity and denies individuals the rights to full citizenship in Kenya. The 
devolution of government to the newly formed counties, and recent economic and 
demographic changes in northern Kajiado, may also be reinforcing Maasai 
groupness in ways not seen in recent years since the perceived ‘threat’ to their way 
of life is increasing under current conditions, and the risk of loss of representation is 
greater under the county government structure.  
Full integration into Kenyan society is a priority for the Maasai, but notably, 
the claim-making made in reference to specific grievances continue to call for special 
recognition of the Maasai people. For example, in rectifying long-standing 
grievances regarding historic land loss, leaders in the Maasai community led by 
several prominent organizations are considering the establishment of a special 
Maasai foundation to be funded by compensation paid to the Maasai by the 
government of Kenya.  The foundation would support the interests of the Maasai by 
funding special development projects in local Maasai communities.  
Another option expressed by the Maasai community in its testimony before 
the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission on their historic land loss is to 
establish a special Maasai bank that would ensure that Maasai pastoralists have 
access to credit to enable the continuation of the pastoral livelihood.212 Other leading 
Maasai organizations in Kajiado noted that they were trying to create “critical 
consciousness” among the Maasai people to unite them in action to protect their 
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communities and way of life—and specifically Maasailand.213  Maasai I spoke with 
also suggested that a priority of the community is to elevate Maasai leaders to 
national prominence and to build linkages among Maasai communities to foster 
greater social mobilization and political unity.  Indeed one of the most interesting 
findings is that Maasai believe that they have to focus more on ethnic solidarity in 
response to contemporary threats. In particular, there is a strongly held belief that 
the success of larger ethnic groups, specifically the Kikuyu, to maintain their 
political and economic advantage derives from their tactical use of ethnic patronage 
to gain standing and power in Kenya—power the minority Maasai have been unable 
to harness.  
 
3.9 Conclusion 
  As noted, the overwhelming shared sense of marginalization among Maasai 
emerged as a central theme in this research.  The recent demographic changes and 
rapid development in Kajiado offer a unique opportunity to explore the perspectives 
of Maasai in relation to issues of land, economic and political vulnerability, and 
most importantly, the continuation of cultural practices such as pastoralism. I 
suggest that deeply held beliefs about the state of the Maasai community reinforce 
existing social structures, including age-set bonds and allegiance to extended clan 
relations, which substitute for more liberal (i.e., individualized) notions of 
citizenship and participation. The cycle of exclusion from the broader Kenyan 
society, particularly in Kenya’s clientelist political system, only reinforce ethnic 
solidarity—as Maasai view their best strategy being derived from ethnic unity.   
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  Chapter 4 examines the political claims being offered by the Maasai and  
attempt to locate the Maasai social movement within the political, cultural and 
economic milieu of contemporary Kenya. In doing so, I hope to offer an overview of 
the opportunities and challenges ahead for the Maasai social movement.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE FUTURE OF THE MAASAI SOCIAL MOVEMENT:  OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CONSTRAINTS 
 
4.1 Introduction:  The Maasai and Kenya’s New Democratic Dispensation 
There have never been more opportunities than today for the Maasai to 
achieve the recognition and inclusion they have so long sought in Kenya. Though 
political progress has been curtailed by centralized governments and deeply 
engrained systems of ethnic patronage since independence, recent reforms appear to 
be ushering in a new era of democratic openness and inclusion. Following the 
period of deadly post-election violence in 2007, many Kenyans realized that if the 
country would continue to function as a united entity it would need to take 
aggressive steps to undercut the forces of division. With this sea change, a renewed 
sense of citizenship and collective aspiration for national unity was born. Under the 
glare of the international community, Kenya undertook comprehensive and wide-
ranging reforms with the goal of forging a new path toward national stability and 
prosperity. The primary impetus for the reforms came from persistent popular 
demand for a more equitable and democratic government as the only way to achieve 
lasting peace in Kenya.  
Land continues to be one of the most contentious issues in national politics—
often conjuring deep historical wounds stemming from the colonial and immediate 
post-colonial policies. The new legal framework for land provided by the 
constitution offers a meaningful path toward the reconciliation of historical 
grievances through the enactment of policies and processes aimed at fostering 
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greater transparency and legitimacy in land transactions.214  Looking forward, the 
Maasai will have considerable opportunities to help frame the national debate on 
land reform. Maintaining constant pressure on national leaders to uphold their 
commitment to these reforms is one of the most important contributions the Maasai 
community can make in the national land debate. This is particularly true given 
emerging concerns about the sustainability and reliability (i.e., funding and support) 
of institutions designed to resolve long-standing grievances and historic injustices 
regarding land.   
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) spent more than a 
year meeting with ethnic communities to put on record historic injustices 
experienced during Kenya’s early independence. However, despite initial optimism, 
Maasai leaders who participated in meetings with TJRC officials are concerned that 
the commission may be limited in its capacity to follow through on terms of 
reconciliation discussed with the community. In particular, discussions between 
TJRC officials and several Maasai communities raised expectations that the 
government would financially compensate the Maasai for historic land loss. Yet, 
there is little indication that the TJRC has the authority to guarantee financial 
compensation or other forms of restitution. Indeed, it seems implausible that the 
government could commit to financial compensation to every community who has 
been wrongfully dispossessed of land and natural resources. However, the real 
danger is in raised expectations. If the processes established to foster national unity 
offer no real means to redress historic grievances, the most likely consequence will 
be a deepened sense of marginalization and animosity among the Maasai.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  The three main components of the new framework are the independent National Land 
Commission (established in 2012), the Land Registration Act of 2012, and the Land Policy Act of 2012.	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Given national development priorities and the current political environment 
in Kenya, it seems that there are two overriding concerns for the Maasai community. 
First, the Maasai must take advantage of opportunities provided by the devolution 
of government by capturing power within the counties where they have a political 
stronghold. These include, principally, Kajiado and Narok Counties. Second, the 
Maasai must be careful to position their political claims within the larger national 
interest. That is, conflict between the Maasai community’s interests and the national 
agenda must be minimized.  
By way of example, of greatest concern to many Maasai in Kajiado County is 
the expansion of the NMR into pastoral lands and the concomitant effect on land 
prices in the County. Indeed, the national focus on strengthening the industrial, 
service and agricultural sectors within the NMR is a major obstacle for the Maasai as 
they seek to protect the remaining open lands for traditional pastoral use.  At the 
same time, the role of pastoralism in the national economy is still greatly 
undervalued, and therefore largely ignored in long-term planning for the nation’s 
economic development. Because of this, planning for long-term land use as a basis 
for national economic development often favors the very sectors (i.e., agricultural 
and industrial) that most severely threaten pastoral lands in Kajiado and Narok 
Counties.  As competition over land increases, the Maasai will be forced to adopt 
more strategic means to promote pastoralism. Accepting the primacy of 
development arguments forces an evolution in the language of advocacy within the 
Maasai social movement. In particular, it will become essential for the Maasai to 
provide economic justification for the continuation of traditional pastoralism, 
especially as practiced on open (often communally managed) lands.  One suggestion 
offered by interlocutors was the promotion of pastoralism as an essential economic 
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activity contributing to Kenya’s overall economic health, resource management, and 
environmental conservation.   
In addition to the economic pressures imposed by the expansion of the NMR, 
many predict increasing tension between the Maasai and other groups moving into 
Kajiado and Narok Counties, especially as changes in demographics threaten to shift 
the balance of power in an area that was once a Maasai stronghold. At a time when 
it might be more difficult to elect Maasai leaders, it is also true that securing local 
political seats has never been more important to the community.  During the period 
of fieldwork, Maasai civil society leaders expressed great concern over the prospect 
of losing political influence in Kajiado County, in particular. While devolution 
provides the opportunity for greater local control over the distribution of resources 
and decisions on development, drastic changes in the social and economic landscape 
of the country could potentially deepen the marginalization of the Maasai. 
 
4.2  Political Representation in the New Kenya:  All Politics is Local  
On March 5, 2013, Kenyans went to the polls in the first national elections 
since the passage of the new constitution. Though it was expected that neither 
leading presidential candidate would meet the constitutional threshold in the first 
round of the elections,215 Jubilee Alliance candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, was declared 
the victor after securing just over 50% of the popular vote. 216  Of the leading six 
presidential hopefuls, the prominent Maasai candidate, Professor Ole Kiyiapi, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  215	  The	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  established	  that	  for	  candidates	  to	  meet	  the	  first-­‐round	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  they	  must	  exceed	  50%	  of	  the	  popular	  vote	  nationwide,	  and	  garner	  at	  least	  25%	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  each	  province.	  	  216	  Despite	  presidential	  candidate	  Raila	  Odinga’s	  appeal	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  overturn	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  IEBC	  to	  award	  the	  presidential	  race	  to	  Uhuru	  Kenyatta	  due	  to	  claims	  of	  voting	  irregularities	  during	  the	  March	  5	  election,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  dismissed	  Odinga’s	  petition	  and	  President	  Kenyatta	  was	  sworn	  into	  office	  on	  April	  9,	  2013.	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garnered only 18,274 votes (less than 1% of the total). Despite the small showing in 
the election, throughout the campaign Professor Ole Kiyiapi’s candidacy allowed 
the issues facing the Maasai community to feature on the national political stage. 
During the country’s first-ever televised presidential debates, he spoke at length 
about the issues facing marginalized communities such as the Maasai. He was also 
called upon to discuss the issues of poverty, education, land, and the environment 
and how they affect the Maasai and other pastoralist communities in particular.  
 While many Maasai I spoke with were disappointed with the election of 
Uhuru Kenyatta and his running-mate William Ruto, there was an overwhelming 
sense of optimism given the overall success of Maasai candidates. Prominent Maasai 
leaders secured the Governor seats in both Narok and Kajiado counties and a 
number of Maasai candidates were elected to the national parliament and county 
assemblies.217  In particular, the election of relatively unknown candidate, Dr. David 
Ole Nkedianye, to the seat of governor in Kajiado County offers the Maasai a unique 
opportunity to influence regional and national policies as they relate to land and 
resource management. Dr. Nkedianye earned a doctorate in Ecology and Natural 
Resource Management at the University of Edinburgh and completed a doctoral 
fellowship at Harvard University where he conducted research on drought-coping 
strategies among the Maasai of Southern Kenya. His expertise on the critical issues 
facing the Maasai will be a tremendous resource for the community. As Governor, 
Dr. Nkedianye will have the opportunity to impact national development policies 
(such as the expansion of the NMR) which are viewed as most threatening to the 
community. As one interlocutor expressed in the days following the election, “I have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  217	  Dr.	  David	  Ole	  Nkedianye	  secured	  the	  seat	  of	  Governor	  of	  Kajiado	  County,	  and	  Samuel	  Kuntai	  Ole	  Tunai	  secured	  the	  seat	  of	  Governor	  in	  Narok	  County.	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got my president already… Ole Nkedianye!  It doesn’t matter who wins at the 
top.”218    
The re-election of long-time Maasai leader, Joseph Ole Nkaissery to represent 
the Kajiado Central Constituency in parliament was one of many local victories for 
the community.  Also of great significance, Peris Tobiko became the first-ever 
woman elected to parliament from the Maasai community when she ousted a 
longstanding male Maasai leader to represent Kajiado East. The head of a prominent 
women’s pastoralist organization, Ms. Tobiko focused her campaign on addressing 
the issues faced by rural Maasai women, a historically underrepresented community 
even within Maasai society. Other notable Maasai candidates that secured seats in 
parliament including Moses ole Sakuda (Kajiado West) and Mr. Katoo ole Metito 
(Kajiado South).  
 
4.3 Seizing Opportunities:  A Strategy for the New Political Dispensation 
The election of Maasai candidates at the national and local level is a 
considerable advantage to the community as it seeks to elevate its position in 
Kenya’s political economy. Based on conversations with leaders within the Maasai 
social movement, there are currently several prevailing political demands being 
made by the Maasai of Kenya. These include: 
(1) Greater participation in public decision making through increased 
representation at the national and local levels; 
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(2) Fair and equitable access to educational and economic 
opportunities, including equal access to higher education, job 
training, and credit and banking services; 
(3) Redress of historic land grievances through compensation or 
other forms of restitution; 
(4) Preservation of the pastoral livelihood; 
(5) And, ensuring the continuation of the Maasai culture. 
 
Of principal concern to many Maasai are the structural asymmetries that 
perpetuate poverty, illiteracy, lack of economic opportunities and limited political 
representation. Yet there are also deeper issues of identity that complicate their 
political demands and the direction of the Maasai social movement in Kenya. 
Persistent calls for greater cultural autonomy and preoccupation with protecting the 
‘Maasai way of life’ suggest that these issues continue to underlie their political 
contestations. In other words, the Maasai want to be accepted as full citizens within 
Kenya while also preserving their status as a unique ethnic group within Kenya’s 
larger national identity.  
However, in the post-2007 environment, ethnicity as a rallying point for social 
mobilization may prove increasingly problematic and ineffective. Though there are 
legitimate claims to be made on behalf of the Maasai community, for instance as 
they relate to shared historical injustices such as communal land loss, advancing the 
Maasai cause through the instrumentality of ethnic identity will be increasingly 
criticized as being discordant with the government’s stated objective of promoting 
national unity. Paradoxically, to the extent that the government may not be freely 
committed to genuine reform, the Maasai could suffer further marginalization on 
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account of framing their political claims in ethnic terms.  It should also be noted that 
while pursuing ethnically-based strategies is often considered a political necessity 
for Kenya’s ethnic minorities, many Maasai with whom I spoke also openly 
criticized members of the larger ethnic groups, particularly the Kikuyu, for 
exploiting Kenya’s deeply rooted system of ethnic patronage. It is a paradox of 
Kenyan politics that mobilization based on ethnicity is both viewed as essential to 
political power and destructive to the dispensation of democracy. Indeed, this 
research finds that ethnic minorities such as the Maasai believe they often have to 
simulate (or adopt) the strategies for participation learned from the dominant ethnic 
groups who have historically monopolized access to power and resources by 
maintaining strong ethnic bonds and systems of ethnic patronage. 219  This finding 
contradicts those of authors such as Ndegwa (1997) who argue that majority ethnic 
groups have been able to cultivate concepts of citizenship and nationalism based on 
republican ideals that abandon ethnic allegiance while minority ethnic groups show 
greater resistance to moving way from ethnic solidarity.  
The reality for ethnic minorities, such as the Maasai, is that they are not likely 
to dominate public discourse in the way that larger ethnic groups can, nor can they 
always control the way their own political demands are framed within the national 
context. Given these challenges, the Maasai social movement must concern itself 
with the limited long-term utility of ethnically-based political claims and strategies. 
Strategic alliances with other communities with common interests—particularly 
other pastoral communities—may prove to be a more effective strategy for 
advancing their political and economic objectives.    
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4.4 Identity and Politics:  The Centrality of Pastoralism to the Maasai Social 
Movement 
As previously noted, there exists a strong desire on the part of the Maasai to 
maintain their unique cultural identities. Discussions with members of the Maasai 
community suggest that contemporary Maasai identity is in many ways embodied in 
the practice of pastoralism.  For many Maasai, particularly those who are educated, 
engaged in other professions, or who primarily reside in urban areas, pastoralism is 
not simply an economic activity. Rather, it is an important cultural identifier linking 
Maasai to forms of indigenous knowledge, traditional beliefs, and cultural practices 
which are believe to be lacking in contemporary Kenyan life.  The continuation of 
pastoralism enables Maasai to participate in cultural rituals and social protocols 
which reinforce a sense of identity and order within, and obligation to, the Maasai 
community. For many urban-dwelling Maasai, pastoralism is the locus of their 
cultural practices and beliefs.  Indeed, professional Maasai living outside of pastoral 
areas often maintain homesteads in rural areas near their families, returning to 
perform weekend pastoralism for the benefit of remaining connected to the central 
tenets of Maasai traditions and customs. As it was described by many professional 
Maasai, by remaining connected to pastoralism, they are reminded of important 
cultural principles embodied in the ideas of brotherhood and community (e.g., the 
practice of coming together to aid individuals and families as signified through the 
social event, called harambee in Kiswahili), and the Maasai’s relationship to the 
natural world.  
The fact that pastoralism is central to contemporary Maasai identity may 
make it a viable rallying point for the social movement. Indeed, the fight to preserve 
traditional pastoralism brings together the most important political, economic and 
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cultural claims being made by the Maasai.  By focusing on pastoralism, cultural 
arguments are made more substantive, as they are better positioned within a 
framework that focuses on economic and environmental gains for the community 
and nation as a whole. To the extent that pastoralism is elevated within national 
discourse, the Maasai are still able to advance their cultural demands because the 
contemporary Maasai culture is so deeply tied to traditional pastoral practices.  
While pastoralism is still greatly undervalued within the larger national 
political economy, there is reason to believe that it is becoming an important issue in 
national economic and social discourse.  For instance, economic and environmental 
issues facing pastoralist communities were discussed at length during the first 
televised presidential debate in February 2013. Though the two leading candidates 
for president expressed divergent views on the future of pastoralism and the 
government’s role in supporting pastoral communities, the fact that the candidates 
were asked to state official positions on this issue is an indicator of its growing 
significance in national politics.220  
 
4.5  Pastoralism as Innovation:  A Strategy for the Maasai Social Movement 
One of the clearest opportunities for advancing Maasai interest in the political 
economy of Kenya is related to the growing national and international interest in 
pastoralism and pastoral communities. In addition to the many international 
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organizations and institutions, there are also several prominent national advocacy 
groups that support pastoralism. The most important perhaps is the Pastoralist 
Parliamentary Group (PPG) which was formed in the late 1990s as an informal 
caucus within the Kenyan parliament.221  Composed of members of parliament who 
represent pastoral communities throughout Kenya, the PPG offers an important 
opportunity to increase political power within the national government by uniting 
the interests of all pastoralist communities. The PPG also works regionally and 
across national borders to influence policies within the East African Community.  
A considerable barrier that must be addressed by the Maasai civil society is 
the limited cooperation which exists between pastoral communities and 
nongovernmental organizations working on their behalf. Although there are several 
national pastoral NGOs, there is a need for the pastoral communities to forge a 
united front for the purpose of advancing their community’s interests.  Part of the 
stigma all pastoralists face is the perception that pastoralism is not an economically 
viable livelihood. However, prominent pastoralist organizations are seeking to 
promote pastoralism as an important economic and environmental activity by re-
conceptualizing the politics of sustainable development within a more holistic 
framework that includes traditional pastoralism. It is argued by some Maasai that 
since traditional pastoralism requires highly specialized knowledge of 
environmental and resource management, the continuation of this practice may 
ensure a more sustainable approach to land use and economic development. In light 
of growing concerns over urbanization and environmental damage caused by rapid 
settlement and industrialization within the environs of Nairobi, some Maasai 	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leaders argue that communal management of open land is the best (perhaps only) 
way to preserve what is left of the natural African landscape.  
Rather than being seen as simply a cultural practice, pastoralism must be 
repositioned as a highly adaptive economic strategy that enable practitioners to 
maximize productivity and contribute positively to the overall economy. Several 
international research institutions are working to promote pastoralism through 
research which seeks to examine its contribution in economic terms.  In 2012, the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD) 
issued a report on the contribution of pastoralism to the Kenyan economy. By 
quantifying the contribution of pastoral products to Kenya’s GDP, the report 
challenged the methods used by the Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) 
which has heretofore driven national discourse on economic development. The 
report calls for the KNBS to revise its national accounting methods, and publically 
acknowledge the significant role pastoralism plays in Kenya’s growing economy.222  
IGAD demonstrated, for example, that more than 80% of Kenya’s beef is supplied by 
pastoralists and there is growing demand for their products. Currently, Kenya is a 
net importer of beef, with nearly 20% of Kenya’s import coming from the 
neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia.223 The report also found that 
the majority of Kenya’s milk production does not flow through official channels and 
there are limitations in the monitoring of prices producers receive for their milk and 
how these prices vary by season, livestock species, or locality.224 The IGAD report 
further suggests that other pastoral products, especially milk, which constitutes 	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more than 70% of the value of livestock’s contribution to the agricultural GDP, are 
not appropriately valued by the KNBS.225 Studies such as these could go a long way 
to buttress the argument that pastoralism is an indispensable force in the national 
economy. Unfortunately, while several major NGOs working with pastoralist 
communities were highlighting the IGAD report during the period of fieldwork, 
there was no concerted effort to promote the significant finding contained within the 
report through the media or in national political circles.    
The current state of affairs calls for strategic collaboration between Maasai 
groups and other groups sympathetic to their cause. The formation of a national 
coalition which can serve as an umbrella organization representing the collective 
interests of pastoralist communities may be one way to ensure better coordination 
and collective action at the national level.  In addition, as the IGAD report 
demonstrates, adopting the language of science, technology and economics to 
position pastoralism as a potent force in modern Kenyan political economy is an 
important strategy to combat the public perception that pastoralism is a primitive 
way of life incongruent with the exigencies of contemporary national development. 
At the same time, it is important to point out that efforts within the Maasai 
community to advance the practice of pastoralism are integral to actually improving 
the economic viability of pastoralism, not simply its public image. For example, new 
applications for cell phones allow pastoralists to access up-to-date market 
information to optimize the sale and acquisition of livestock. Many Maasai 
organizations are also working directly with pastoralists to promote new 
prophylaxis treatment regimen to prevent parasites in livestock as an integral part of 
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a comprehensive public health campaign to reduce the spread of parasites to 
humans and improve the quality of beef and dairy products.  
These efforts to change the practice (and perception) of pastoralism are 
critical to advancing Maasai interests. Uniting with a broader coalition of pastoral 
communities and organizations may be the best chance for the Maasai to gain 
political power and impact the policies affecting their community. While there are 
some indications that the Maasai are open to this strategy, more must be done by 
leaders within their communities to stress the importance of coordination and 
collaboration within Maasai civil society as well as the larger national pastoralist 
community.  
 
4.6 Maasai as Leaders in a New Cultural Movement 
As previously discussed, the Maasai social movement includes demands for 
cultural recognition. For many Maasai, there is a concern that in the push for 
development Kenya risks losing its unique cultural heritage. These leaders are 
calling for cultural revival on the national level, where all ethnic groups may be 
celebrated as an integral part of a collective and diverse national identity. Because 
pastoralism is integral to the Maasai way of life, the focus on preserving traditional 
pastoralism will go a long way to ensuring cultural preservation. However, some 
activists within Maasai civil society believe more should be done to promote cultural 
harmony and tolerance in the context of a multiethnic Kenya.  
Several Maasai activists were concerned that there has been no effort to 
celebrate Kenya’s diverse ethnic heritage, as reflected in the type of discrimination 
the Maasai have suffered. They argue that ethnicity has been used only as a divisive 
tool in the economic and political spheres of life. To combat what they see as a 
	   	   105	  
cultural deficit, several activists I spoke with are advocating for a revision of the 
national education curriculum to include comprehensive cultural education aimed 
at elevating Kenya’s multi-ethnic heritage. Rather than “regulating against 
ethnicity,” many Maasai leaders argue that ethnic diversity must be understood and 
celebrated. While instituting a comprehensive cultural education policy may be a 
longer-term goal, it should be a part of a long-term policy of national reconciliation 
and reconstruction desired to accommodate both large and minority groups in a 
new democratic Kenya. For example, despite being one of the largest and most 
powerful ethnic groups in Kenya, the Luo have historically been discriminated 
against by the Kikuyu because of their cultural practice of not circumcising men.  
In the course of my field work, two popular songs came under scrutiny in 
Kenya for lyrics which suggest that the Luo are unfit to lead the nation. One song, 
titled “Uhuru ni Witu” (Swahili for Uhuru is our Son, in reference to Kikuyu 
presidential aspirant, Uhuru Kenyatta) made reference to the biblical command to 
circumcise boys to mark their entry into manhood. Another song titled “Hague 
Bound” included the following lyrics which speak to the mistrust between the 
Kikuyu and Luo communities and the cultural practices which prejudice the 
respective ethnic groups: 
What if you knew that you are being pushed to the 
Hague by an uncircumcised man who wants to push you 
there and take over your wife and all your wealth?  A 
man who can do anything to ensure you are in problems. 
Then, it is better to die. Things for men are not governed 
by an uncircumcised man. I would kill him. It’s better 
they increase my charges…… what would you be 
thinking of the uncircumcised man who is the source of 
your predicament?  I would ask God to forgive him. I 
would also ask that he gets circumcised so that he 
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matures mentally. I would also ask Kenyans to be wary 
of that man. (emphasis added) 226  
 
 
While the Maasai may be at a political disadvantage because of their minority 
status, they are also uniquely positioned to become leaders in a new cultural 
movement. In a time when Kenya continues to struggle with ethnic division and 
conflict, the Maasai offer a new approach to cultural diversity which calls for more 
recognition and celebration of all cultures, not simply their own. The Maasai already 
have a political leader well-positioned to lead this cultural revolution in Minister 
William ole Ntimama who serves as Kenya’s first Minister of National Heritage and 
Culture.  By elevating the role of the Maasai in promoting cultural revitalization in 
Kenya, they may be able to redeem their own image as forward thinking leaders 
rather than relics of Kenya’s antiquated past.   
 
4.7  Harnessing Power from Within: The Rise of Maasai Women and Youth 
 In recent years, the rise of women and youth have changed the dynamics of 
the Maasai social movement in potentially very positive ways. The recent election of 
Ms. Peris Tobiko to represent the Kajiado East constituency suggests that there is a 
progressive movement within the Maasai community which is more equitable and 
inclusive than the former patriarchal system. The high rate of youth unemployment, 
especially in rural Kajiado, contributes to instability within the community. Feelings 
of exclusion and marginalization are high among the youth, particularly males, who 
are unable to fully enter adulthood (i.e., marry, establish a homestead, and bear 
children) because of limited economic opportunities. The delay of their transition to 	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adulthood is particularly disruptive to Maasai society, which traditionally requires 
young men to advance to higher positions of power and authority within their 
families and communities once they attain the requisite age and position in life. 
These factors, as well as perceived undervaluation of pastoralism’s role in Kenyan 
economic life are motivating many youth and women to enter the political sphere.  
 Several interlocutors working with NGOs told me that they believe young 
men and women are becoming increasingly frustrated with Maasai elders who are 
blamed for many of the changes in Maasai society, including most significantly the 
recent selling of pastoral lands for development which many see as ensuring the 
demise of future generations of pastoralists. Today, more than ever, Maasai women 
and youth are clamoring for greater opportunity within the society to stem the 
steady loss of Maasai culture and resources they have witnessed throughout their 
lives. Subsequently, there has been a rise in the number of youth groups and 
women’s organizations aimed at elevating women and youth to positions of 
leadership. The influence of women on the Maasai social movement, and national 
politics, is an interesting area of future research. In addition, the role of international 
aid and development organizations in this movement should also be considered 
given the international focus on empowering these populations as part of 
comprehensive development. For the Maasai, growing acceptance of women in 
politics marks a fundamental cultural shift. In the rural areas, many Maasai women 
are still discouraged (or prohibited) from engaging in politics without the explicit 
permission of elder men in their families. The transition to greater gender equity in 
the political sphere, and in particular, broad support for women leaders such as 
Peris Tobiko are positive developments for the once paternalistic Maasai society.   
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4.8 Conclusion 
 This chapter identifies the challenges and opportunities facing contemporary 
pastoralist Maasai and offers recommendations for future political engagement and 
social mobilization. In particular, findings suggest that rapid industrialization, 
settlement, and environmental degradation in the northern region of “Maasailand” 
(principally defined as Kajiado County) is viewed as most threatening to the 
livelihood and future economic development of the Maasai. In addition, the 
concomitant demographic shift is considered a threat which may further 
marginalize the Maasai politically, especially in areas once considered Maasai 
strongholds.  It is difficult to predict how the expansion of the NMR into Kajiado 
and Narok counties might effect the solidarity of the larger Maasai movement over 
time given that the effects of development (both negative and positive) will be 
experienced differently across the Maasai population. The unity of the Maasai 
community during the 2004-2005 protests—which was largely driven by historical 
grievances held by the Laikipia Maasai—suggest that even local-specific issues may 
serve to reinforce solidarity among the larger Maasai community. Yet, there are 
many unknown variables to consider. For instance, devolution of government to the 
newly formed counties and wards may also influence the social organization and 
political mobilization of the Maasai.  In particular, if decisions affecting Maasai 
communities are increasingly made at the local level, it may become more difficult 
(or infeasible) to mobilize the Maasai in nationwide social movements.  
Finally, it is also possible that fractures within the Maasai community, if they 
do arise, will fall along not geographic (i.e., based on different political 
constituencies) but generational lines. This may be true especially if younger Maasai 
who are seeking entry into sectors of the economy outside of pastoralism are  able to 
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utilize the opportunities availed to them through the expansion of the NMR and 
other national development initiatives (e.g., accessing employment opportunities in 
emerging sectors such as construction and the service industry, job training, or 
advanced education). Of course, the benefits of development in Maasai areas must 
materialize for this transformation to occur. As noted in this chapter, many Maasai 
expressed concern that while development brought new jobs to the area, the Maasai 
have not been the major beneficiaries because of the influx of populations from other 
areas of the country who are migrating to northern Kajiado in search of 
employment.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions 
  
The objective of this thesis was to explore the historic and contemporary 
cultural, economic, social, and political factors which reinforce social mobilization 
and political participation among Kenya’s Maasai.  As stated in the introductory 
chapter, the Maasai make an interesting case study of ethnic social movements given 
their long tradition of social mobilization and political claim-making regarding land 
dispossession, and economic,  social,  and cultural marginalization. In this research I 
sought to examine the experiences, perspectives, strategies, and action repertoires 
that characterize the Maasai social movement in Kenya by locating the 
contemporary movement in a historical context. Though this research included 
interviews with leaders of national NGOs and civil society organizations, I elected to 
focus on the Maasai community of Kajiado County given the geographic 
significance of this area and because of the magnitude of large-scale development 
projects occurring in this region of the country today.  
This study sought to understand the complex nature of ethnic allegiance by 
examining the individual perspectives and experiences which reinforce ethnically-
based political identity and social mobilization among the Maasai of Kenya. One of 
the particular challenges for this study was the inherent problem associated with 
defining a singular Maasai ethnic community. Because what it means to be Maasai 
may be ever-shifting and evolving, any social mobilization or political claims made 
by individuals or groups identifying themselves as Maasai may not be quantifiable 
or stable. In examining the broad literature on ethnicity, this study draws heavily on 
the work of Brubaker (2002) who argues that we must reject the tendency to utilize 
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conceptions of “ethnic groupism” which treat ethnic groups as internally 
homogenous and externally bounded, collective actors with a common purpose. 
Instead, Brubaker suggests that ethnicity is best conceptualized as not a “thing in the 
world” but a “perspective on the world.”227  Within this cognitive frame, the work of 
this research was to understand how and why ethnic and national categories take on 
meaning in the daily life of Maasai, inspire solidarity, and animate the Maasai into 
social action. However, since as Young (2000) suggests, group-based movements are 
often derived not from ethnic or cultural difference per se, but from “relatively 
constituted structural differentiations,” this research also sought to contextualize the 
Maasai situation within the larger economic, political, and cultural environment in 
historical and contemporary Kenya. 228  
Chapter 2 explored the history of the Maasai, first during the pre-colonial era 
when the Maasai emerged as a distinct group from the larger Maa speaking 
population. Next, I examined the experiences of the Maasai vis-à-vis other ethnic 
communities during the process of state formation in Kenya. Indeed, this history 
demonstrates that the Maasai’s contemporary political identity is greatly informed 
by historical interactions between the Maasai and other ethnic groups throughout 
the period of state formation, in particular in the late colonial and early post-
independence period. The forced relocation of Maasai to permanent settlements in 
the southern Rift Valley and the loss of land and livestock experienced under British 
colonial rule are identified as central factors positioning the Maasai on the periphery 
of Kenyan society.  
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Building on my theoretical approach to understanding ethnic mobilization, 
chapter 2 argues that the Maasai’s engagement as a distinct ethnic constituency 
during the colonial and immediate post-colonial eras served to reinforce a particular 
political identity based on collective feelings of marginalization and exclusion.  Deep 
animosity regarding the loss of land under British occupation, and the failure of 
post-independence regimes to rectify these injustices only exacerbated social 
solidarity and the making of the contemporary Maasai political identity. In 
particular, the failure of national leaders to resolve historic grievances with regard to 
land loss and reluctance to provide for more equitable distribution of resources and 
greater representation of minority groups in national government came to define the 
Maasai’s antagonism to the ethnic majority-led regimes of Daniel Arap Moi and 
Mwai Kibaki.  
The thesis next sought to locate the Maasai in contemporary, post-reform 
Kenya. In particular, it is argued that while the wide-ranging constitutional reforms 
of 2010 offer the Maasai new opportunities to engage in the political and economic 
spheres of society, there is a prevailing sense of insecurity among many Maasai 
because of recent demographic, political, and social changes in the country, 
particularly in Kajiado County, which has seen rapid development and in-migration 
in recent years.  National development priorities which favor industrialization, 
agriculture, and the construction of peri-urban settlements to alleviate urban 
crowding are translating into increased competition over land and other natural 
resources in many areas of the country. This is particularly true in northern Kajiado 
and Narok Counties where the expansion of the Nairobi Metropolitan Region is 
causing rapid changes in land use, and demographic and economic transformations.  
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As chapter 3 demonstrates, the rapid development of Maasailand contributes 
to increased feelings of economic, political, and cultural vulnerability within the 
Maasai community. In particular, among many Maasai are concerns about the loss 
of pastoral lands, demographic shifts, and concomitant economic marginalization 
that comes from increased competition for employment in other sectors of the 
economy. What is most significant among the findings are that these contemporary 
experiences only serve to reinforce long-standing feelings of marginalization and 
exclusion based on what the Maasai view is a systematic prejudice against them. 
While there were differing views on the nature of the prejudice—some arguing it 
was negative stereotyping of pastoralists in general, others suggesting there is a bias 
against the Maasai in particular—universally, I found that the Maasai believe they 
are denied equal opportunity in Kenya based solely on ‘being Maasai.’ Lack of 
opportunity due to “discrimination,” (an oft used term among interlocutors, even 
among highly educated Maasai) it is suggested here, appears to reinforce strong 
feelings of isolation and exclusion and the desire to foster greater ethnic solidarity 
among Maasai as a strategy for engaging in the political and economic spheres of 
society. The persistence of ethnic solidarity among the Maasai may be attributed in 
great part to the nature of Kenya’s political history of ethno-linguistic division and 
clientelism. However, I also found that one of the consequences of the shared 
feelings of marginalization and exclusion among the Maasai is a strong desire to 
reassert their cultural heritage and ‘Maasainess.’ This seems particularly significant 
among the youth (culturally defined as persons between 15-30 years old).  
Indeed, as chapter 3 concludes, collective feeling of exclusion may be an 
important catalyst for Maasai ‘groupness’ and group formation in contemporary 
Kenya as it reinforces cohesiveness within the community. Considering Brubaker 
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(2002), it might also be true that moments of intense conflict, or perceived threat, 
represent times when ethnic identity (and solidarity) among Maasai crystalize and 
are animated into action. The 100th anniversary of the Anglo-Maasai treaties in 2004 
which sparked nationwide protests among the Maasai, the death of Professor Saitoti 
in 2012 and subsequent election cycle, and policies such as the expansion of the 
NMR into Kajiado and Narok counties may all represent such crystalizing moments 
for the Maasai.   
There is also some indication that shared feelings and experiences of 
marginalization among Maasai youth may serve to reinforce traditional social 
structures, specifically the age-mate structure among groups of Maasai who come of 
age at the same time. Age-mate bonds play a central role in social relations among 
Maasai youth with whom I spoke, and age-mate solidarity may to some extent 
explain why there is a perceived need to protect one another from outside influences 
and ‘threats’. In short, the collectivism reinforced through the age-mate structure 
may give way to a deepening of ethnic bonds and a strengthening of ethnic 
solidarity. If this is true, ethnic allegiance may be viewed by the Maasai as the best 
strategy for participation in Kenya’s political system.  
In chapter 4 I examined the dominant political claims being made by the 
Maasai as well as their strategy for political participation in post-reform Kenya. Of 
principle concern to many Maasai is the need to remove the structural asymmetries 
that perpetuate poverty, illiteracy, lack of economic opportunities and limited 
political participation within the community. Yet, as I point out, there are also 
deeper issues of identity that complicate the Maasai community’s political demands 
and the direction of the social movement. In particular, calls for greater cultural 
autonomy and the preoccupation with protecting the ‘pastoral way of life’ suggest 
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that preservation of the unique cultural and historical identity of the Maasai people 
continues to underlie their political contestations and social mobilization.  
Because demands for cultural and ethnic recognition may, at first glance, 
appear contradictory to the Maasai’s demands for full inclusion it is important to 
explore more fully the cultural claims being made by the Maasai. Indeed, as I point 
out in chapter 4, discussions with members of the Maasai community suggest that 
contemporary Maasai identity is in many ways embodied in the practice of 
pastoralism. In this way, pastoralism is not simply an economic activity, but rather, 
it remains an important cultural identifier linking Maasai to forms of indigenous 
knowledge, traditional beliefs, and cultural practices which are viewed as otherwise 
lacking in Kenyan life. Therefore, many of the cultural claims being made by the 
Maasai may be most accurately described as demands for the preservation of 
pastoralism, or alternatively, claims against policies that threaten the pastoral way of 
life.  
While the Maasai’s social movement in Kenya sheds light on the way ethnic 
solidarity works to reinforce ethnic bonds, social mobilization and political claim-
making, especially for minority ethnic groups, an examination of the contemporary 
Maasai social movement also elucidates the limits of ethnic claim-making within the 
complex social, political and economic environment in Kenya. One of the 
recommendations made in this chapter relates to the elevation of pastoralism as a 
central tenet of the Maasai social movement.  In particular, it is argued, a focus on 
pastoralism allows the Maasai to build strategic alliances with other domestic 
pastoral communities, and draw upon the collective political power of international 
movements to support pastoralism and promote fuller inclusion of pastoral 
communities in national development policies. This may include building support to 
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aid pastoralists in their transition into other sectors of the economy. This 
recommendation is based in part on the realization that political mobilization based 
on non-ethnic social identities or characteristics, such as membership within a larger 
pastoralist community or as part of a national platform to increase the participation 
of women in politics, may prove more strategic and effective as a means to advance 
the Maasai’s political demands. This is especially true in a post-reform Kenya which 
may be increasingly less tolerant of ethnically-based social mobilization.  
Chapter 4 also examines other changes within Maasai society which may 
ultimately serve to advance the social mobilization and political representation of 
the community in local and national politics. Two of the most significant 
developments are the increased acceptability of Maasai women in politics and the 
increased mobilization of organizations representing the interest of women and 
youth in Maasai society.  Both of these developments may be viewed within larger 
social context in Kenya including provisions in the new constitution which provide 
special protections for these groups, and call for more equitable representation of 
women and youth in national government. However, as I discuss in this chapter, the 
elevation of women into politics within Maasai society marks a significant cultural 
shift within the historically patriarchal Maasai society, and should be an interesting 
area of future research.  
It seems that within the context of the changing political, economic and social 
environment in Kenya the Maasai may finally gain the political power and position 
to resolve their long-standing grievances.  In particular, the devolution of 
government offers them greater control over decision-making and resources at the 
local level, especially as it relates to the development of pastoral lands. However, 
national development priorities may continue to present significant challenges for 
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the Maasai community. Two such priorities for future consideration include the 
national objective to achieve middle income nation status by 2030, and the 
administration and continued development of the expanded NMR.  
Future research should also consider how the ongoing demographic changes 
and rapid development in Kajiado and Narok Counties affect the Maasai 
community in the coming years. Few environmental impact studies or demographic 
studies have been conducted to date to quantify the changes in population, land use, 
and ecology in northern Maasailand. Likewise, as previously stated, the influence of 
societal changes within Maasai society should be examined in future ethnographic 
studies. Of particular interest will be the influence of increasingly politically active 
women and youth on the Maasai social movement. 
Finally, and in conclusion, while the Maasai made significant gains in terms 
of political representation in the first election under the new constitution—and 
indeed there is great optimism within the community with respect for the 
opportunities at hand—it remains to be seen whether devolution and the new 
dispensation of democracy will finally provide the power, authority, and autonomy 
for which the Maasai have so long fought.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
GoogleImage 1:  Athi River, Kajiado County North, 2003 
GoogleImage 2:  Athi River, Kajiado County North, 2013 
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GoogleImage 3:  Athi River Growth of Greenhouses, East of Athi-Kitengela, 
Northern Kajiado County, 2012 
 
 
GoogleImage 4:  Kitengela, Kajiado County North, 2004 
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GoogleImage 5:  Kitengela, Kajiado County North, 2012 
 
GoogleImage 6:  South of Kitengela Town, Along A104 toward Kajiado Town, 
2003 
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GoogleImage 7:  South of Kitengela, Along A104 toward Kajiado Town, 2011 
 
GoogleImage 8:  Isinya, South of Kitengela, Kajiado County, 2011 
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GoogleImage 9:  Kajiado Town, Central Kajiado County, 2011 (Historical images 
not available) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  All GoogleMaps images obtained from GoogleEarth ©.  
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APPENDIX B 
Proposed Occupational Structure and Land Use, Kenya 2030 	  Chart	  1:	  Kitengela 	  
 
 
 
 
Chart 2:  Isinya 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Chart 3:  Kajiado 	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  	  Charts	  obtained	  from	  the	  Development	  of	  a	  Spatial	  Planning	  Concept	  for	  Nairobi	  Metropolitan	  Region,	  Study	  Status	  Executive	  Summary,	  Republic	  of	  Kenya	  Ministry	  of	  Nairobi	  Metropolitan	  Development,	  February	  2011.	  Accessed	  at	  www.nairobimetro.go.ke.	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Appendix C 
Biographical Information on Cited Interlocutors 
 
Interlocutor A is a university-educated health professional living and working in 
rural Kajiado County; male, age 30, married with one child. He is self-described as 
politically active. He has organized political rallies and fundraisers for local political 
candidates, and is considered an important leader in the community.  
 
Interlocutor B is a former chief and district commissioner who is retired and living 
on a traditional boma in Kajiado County with his three wives; male, age 
approximately 75; primary school education. While he does not currently hold 
political office, he serves on local elder councils and advises several prominent 
political leaders within the Maasai community.  
 
Interlocutor C is a graduate student in information technology at Narok University; 
male, unmarried, aged mid-twenties. He is a self-described “Maasai activist” and is 
active in mobilizing youth within the community. He resides in Narok but 
maintains land and livestock in Kajiado County where his family resides. 
 
Interlocutor D is an executive in a non-governmental organization focused on 
elevating the role of women pastoralists in national and local politics; female, 
married, aged early-thirties. She lives in Nairobi with her family but maintains land 
and livestock in Kajiado County.  
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Interlocutor E is a university educated journalist and self-described “political 
activist” working in a national nongovernmental organization representing the 
interest of Kenya’s pastoralist communities. He has written extensively on human 
rights issues faced by the Maasai and was active in the 2004-2005 nationwide protest 
movement of the Maasai community. He resides in Nairobi with his wife and three 
children but maintains a homestead and livestock in Narok County; age early 40s. 
 
Interlocutor F is the executive director of a nongovernmental organization based in 
Kajiado County that supports the local Maasai pastoralist community. He considers 
himself a longstanding leader in the community and outspoken “activist” who has 
been politically active since the Moi era. He is married with children and resides in 
Kajiado County, age late 50s.  
 
Interlocutor G is employed in the office of the District Development Commission in 
Kajiado County; female, unmarried, late-twenties.  
 
Note to Reader: I elected to include biographical information only for individuals who agreed 
to participate in formal interviews and to the inclusion of direct quotes. 
However, in addition to the aforementioned interlocutors, this thesis contains extensive 
information provided by numerous other acquaintances whose perspectives, opinions, and 
experiences greatly contributed to this research.  
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indigenous rights, and international development. Thesis research entailed in-depth ethnographic research in 
Kenya from May through August 2012. This study examines the ways political and economic systems in 
postcolonial Kenya, including development policy, impact the pastoralist Maasai of the southern Rift Valley. 
Thesis title:  In Search of Nation: The Political Identity and Social Mobilization of Kenya’s Maasai. 
 
Masters in Public Affairs (M.P.A.)  June 2013 
School of Public and Environmental Affairs 
Indiana University 
Bloomington, Indiana 
 
Concentration in comparative and international affairs; graduate study included coursework in economics, 
public finance, research methodology, statistics, sustainable development, international relations, comparative 
public management, globalization and entrepreneurship.  
 
Bachelor of Science (B.S.)    May 1998 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Indiana University 
Bloomington, Indiana 
 
Major:  Psychology 
Minor:  Anthropology 
 
III.  PROFESSIONAL SKILLS AND EXPERTISE 
 
An internationally focused professional with diverse experience and education in international 
relations/development, public policy, legislative affairs, advocacy, grant management, and research.  Previous 
work with domestic and international NGOs, civil society organizations, with particular focus on marginalized 
and indigenous communities, youth and women. Experience living and working in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA).Excellent written and oral communication, and strong analytical and organizational skills. Demonstrated 
experience in translating complex technical, scientific and regulatory issues into relevant policy and advocacy 
discourse.  
 
	   
 
 
IV. PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
U.S. Peace Corps     2007-2008 (Early Close of Service Due to Political 
Unrest) 
Republic of Kenya     
 
Managed PERFAR-funded projects on HIV/AIDS education and outreach in collaboration with the Kenyan 
Ministry of Health and Anglican Inland Church of Kenya. Orchestrated 2007 World AIDS Day Community 
Soccer Tournament and Youth Education Project for Kajiado District with the AIC Church and Red Cross of 
Kajiado, delivering HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment messages to more than 200 participants. Coordinated 
youth HIV/AIDS education program in local primary schools reaching approximately 75 youth between the 
ages of 12-16. Collaborated with the International Trachoma Initiative in Kenya to host training of 40 
community leaders on water, sanitation and trachoma prevention strategies.  
 
Director, Public Policy    January 2005–March 2007  
BatesNeimand, Inc. 
Washington, D.C. 
       
Directed federal public policy and advocacy campaigns for non-profit and non-governmental organizations; 
represented client interests before Congress, federal agencies, and within national coalitions. Responsibilities 
included policy analysis, public program evaluation, strategic planning, and project management. Experience 
translating complex technical policy issues into concise policy briefs, talking points, and advocacy material for 
diverse audiences including public officials, Capitol Hill staff, executive staff of non-profit and non-
governmental organizations, and the media.   
 
Legislative Affairs Associate   December 2001-December 2004 
Legislative Assistant    August 1998-August 1999 
The Sheridan Group 
Washington, D.C.   
 
Demonstrated a broad range of skills, including public policy analysis, project management, direct lobbying, 
strategic planning, targeted publicity and advocacy event planning. Notable achievements include planning a 
women’s heath symposium on behalf of the National Organization for Women (NOW) which garnered the 
support and participation of leading researchers from across the country and representatives of federal agencies, 
crafting white papers and briefing packages, and authoring a public health brochure titled A Guy’s Guide to 
Mammography which garnered the endorsement of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
Organized semi-annual advocacy training events for 50-150 participants. Clients included Population Council, 
the ONE Campaign, San Francisco AIDS Foundation, Alliance for Justice, American Cancer Society, 
Mesothelioma Applied Research Council, and the Pancreatic Cancer Action Network among others. 
 
Environmental Health Program Manager  August 2000-November 2001 
American Lung Association 
Los Angeles, C.A. 
 
Managed federal grant funded by the Environmental Protection Agency; represented the ALA in coalitions and 
before local government officials. Increased participation in the Tools for Schools, EPA Indoor Air Quality 
Program in Los Angeles County by 300%. 
 
VI.  LANGUAGES 
 
MOTHER TONGUE:  English 
OTHER LANGUAGES:  Swahili (Advanced)    
 
	   
 
VII.  PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS 
 
Investing in Innovation:  The National Institutes of Health, Making Healthy Progress in our Lifetime, published 
by the National Health Council, Washington, D.C. (September 2006) 
 
A Guy’s Guide to Mammography, published by Men Against Breast Cancer in cooperation with the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control (March 2005) 
 
VIII.  AWARDS 
 
Foreign Language Area Studies (FLAS) Fellowship, Swahili (Summer award, 2011; Academic year award, 
2011-2012) 
Academic Excellence Award, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University (2011) 
Pi Alpha Alpha National Honor Society for Public Affairs and Administration, Indiana University (2011) 
Peace Corps Fellowship, Indiana University (2009, declined) 
 
 
 
 
